SWAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1/26/2015 11:38 PM

HOME RULES
SARAH SWAN†
ABSTRACT
Thousands of American cities and towns are responding to social
problems like bullying, drug abuse, and criminality by passing
ordinances that hold individuals responsible for the wrongful acts of
their family members and friends. Parental liability ordinances
impose sanctions on parents when their children engage in bullying or
other targeted behaviors; mandatory terms in rental housing leases
require the eviction of tenants whose family members, friends, or
guests engage in unlawful acts; and nuisance ordinances require
evictions when a threshold number of calls to police is exceeded, even
though such calls are often related to another person’s wrongful or
abusive behavior.
Cities typically rely on home rule authority to pass these
ordinances, and these ordinances in turn create new “home rules” for
the households affected. These new home rules are a form of thirdparty policing, and through them, the city is becoming an increasingly
significant player in governing families and regulating intimate
spaces. These home rules cut against the standard understanding of
the home as mostly private and self-governed, and instead configure it
as a site of state-required risk management and crime prevention. In
so doing, these ordinances destabilize families and disrupt kinship
structures, regardless of whether one is able to comply with them or
not. Further, the ordinances allocate the burdens of preventing crime
and managing risk in a manner inflected with gender, race, and class
issues. Fortunately, the dynamism of localism can promise a better
solution to the social problems that prompted these ordinances in the
first place.
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INTRODUCTION
The ability to “establish a home and bring up children” is a
1
fundamental part of the American dream. Lately, however, residents
in thousands of cities and towns across America are finding their
1. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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ability to do this undermined by a number of local ordinances. These
ordinances, passed in response to pressing social problems like
bullying, criminality, and drug abuse, use strict or vicarious liability to
hold parents and other heads of household legally responsible for the
3
wrongful actions of their family members and friends. For example,
parental liability ordinances threaten parents with fines and other
penalties if they do not prevent their children from bullying others, or
4
if their children engage in other targeted behaviors. Additionally,
crime-free ordinances mandate that rental housing leases must
include a “crime-free lease addendum,” which sets out how tenants
will be evicted if their friends or family members commit an unlawful
act on or near the leased premises. Similarly, nuisance laws require a
tenant’s eviction from rental housing if a threshold number of calls to
the police is exceeded, even if the basis for the calls is another
person’s wrongful or abusive behavior.
These laws can be understood as a form of third-party policing,
an increasingly important form of regulation and law enforcement
5
that is now often deployed to address social problems. In third-party
policing, the state requires private parties—who neither participate in
nor benefit from the misconduct they are compelled to address—to
enforce laws and prevent misconduct by enacting some method of
6
control over a primary wrongdoer. Failure to perform these assigned
7
duties results in civil or criminal sanctions.
The private parties typically called upon to perform these
enforcement duties are businesses, professionals, and industrial
8
actors, and the sites that they are asked to police are typically public.
However, fairly early in its development, third-party policing began
targeting a more intimate arena. Through parental liability laws and
the “one-strike” policy for residents of federal public housing
projects, tenants and parents were required to police their homes.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 93–101 and 116–18.
3. Although “head of household” has a technical meaning as a filing status for individual
income tax purposes, it is used here in a more generic sense, as a broad term that encompasses
any adult, tenant of record, or parental figure who performs the role of taking care of a home
and the people in it.
4. See infra notes 100–09 and accompanying text.
5. LORRAINE MAZEROLLE & JANET RANSLEY, THIRD PARTY POLICING 45–46 (2005).
6. REINIER H. KRAAKMAN, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-party Enforcement
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986).
7. MAZEROLLE & RANSLEY, supra note 5, at 7.
8. Janet A. Gilboy, Compelled Third-Party Participation in the Regulatory Process: Legal
Duties, Culture, and Noncompliance, 20 LAW & POL’Y 135, 135 (1998).
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Both parental liability laws and the one-strike policy became
popular in the late 1980s, the former in response to a perceived
increased in juvenile crime and disorder, and the latter in response to
9
extremely high crime rates in federal public housing projects. Under
parental liability laws, parents were held legally responsible for the
wrongful actions of their children. Under the one-strike policy,
residents of federal public housing could be evicted if anyone
associated with their household engaged in any criminal or drug10
related behavior on the premises.
Initially, significant bodies of scholarship grew up around both
11
the parental liability laws and the one-strike policy. However, this
scholarship tended to treat each as isolated phenomena and focused
on parental liability laws at the state level, and the one-strike policy at
the federal one. But, “in the shadow of the debate” about these
policies, “local governments nationwide have quietly implemented

9. JOEL SAMAHA, CRIMINAL LAW 229 (10th ed. 2010). Although the number of juveniles
arrested for violent crime actually decreased in the period between 1978 and 1987, the number
of those arrests that were for rape and aggravated assault went up. Kathryn J. Parsley,
Constitutional Limitations on State Power to Hold Parents Criminally Liable for the Delinquent
Acts of Their Children, 44 VAND. L. REV. 441, 444 (1991). Further, the following year there was
a drastic overall increase in juvenile arrests for violent crimes. Id.
10. For a discussion of the background and development of the one-strike policy, see
generally Caroline Castle, Note, You Call That a Strike? A Post-Rucker Examination of
Eviction from Public Housing Due to Drug-Related Criminal Activity of a Third Party, 37 GA. L.
REV. 1435 (2003). Notably, in 2010, 86 percent of the evictions in federal housing projects in
Chicago under the one-strike policy were for third-party activity. Laura Peterson, Collective
Sanctions: Learning from the NFL’s Justifiable Use of Group Punishment, 14 TEX. REV. ENT. &
SPORTS L. 165, 165 (2013).
11. Examples of scholarship focused on the federal one-strike policy include Regina
Austin, “Step on a Crack, Break Your Mother’s Back”: Poor Moms, Myths of Authority, and
Drug-Related Evictions from Public Housing, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 273, 275 (2002);
Christopher Mele, The Civil Threat of Eviction and the Regulation and Control of U.S. Public
Housing Communities, in CIVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 121, 130 (Christopher
Mele & Teresa Miller eds., 2005); Bryan Cho, Note, Getting Evicted for the Actions of Others: A
Proposed Amendment to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1229, 1234–35 (2003);
Margaret E. Finzen, Note, Systems of Oppression: The Collateral Consequences of Incarceration
and Their Effects on Black Communities, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 299, 313–14
(2005); and Lisa Weil, Note, Drug-Related Evictions in Public Housing: Congress’ Addiction to a
Quick Fix, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 171 (1991). Examples of scholarship focused on
parental liability include Valerie D. Barton, Comment, Reconciling the Burden: Parental
Liability for the Tortious Acts of Minors, 51 EMORY L.J. 877, 879 (2002); Jerry E. Tyler &
Thomas W. Segady, Parental Liability Laws: Rationale, Theory, and Effectiveness, 37 SOC. SCI. J.
79, 81–82 (2000); Jason Emilios Dimitris, Comment, Parental Responsibility Statutes—And the
Programs That Must Accompany Them, 27 STETSON L. REV. 655, 662 (1997). This literature
generally focuses on parental liability laws at the state level, and has not yet focused on how
they combine with other laws to target the home at the local level.
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programs that apply the same ‘one strike’ logic.” Crime-free lease
addendums and chronic-nuisance-abatement ordinances use the same
form of vicarious liability as the one-strike policy, and local law has
now brought that vicarious liability to bear on a much larger portion
13
of the population. An estimated 100 million people occupy 38.6
million rental properties in America, and given that crime-free lease
addendums and nuisance ordinances are currently present in nearly
2000 cities and towns across the nation, many of these households are
14
now subject to eviction based on the wrongdoing of others. Parental
liability ordinances are expanding, too, both in terms of the scope of
behaviors they encompass, and the increasing number of cities
15
enacting them.
Despite their burgeoning numbers, the crime-free lease
addendums, nuisance ordinances, and expanding parental liability
16
ordinances have flown mostly under the radar of legal scholarship.
There are two reasons for this. First, the origin of these rules in local
law has allowed them to proliferate mostly unnoticed. With the
exception of a small group of prominent local-law scholars, the legal
17
academy generally tends to overlook local law. And, as a practical
point, the breadth and variances between jurisdictions make it a
18
difficult area to empirically or sometimes even qualitatively study.
The second reason that these ordinances have proliferated
relatively unremarked is that third-party policing itself is “generally

12. Scott Duffield Levy, Note, The Collateral Consequences of Seeking Order Through
Disorder: New York’s Narcotics Eviction Program, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 539, 540 (2008)
(emphasis added).
13. Id.
14. Janet Hawkins, Landlord Accountability and Crime Prevention, 63 CRIME
PREVENTION 66, 66 (2011).
15. Jennifer M. Collins, Ethan J. Leib & Dan Markel, Punishing Family Status, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 1327, 1340 (2008).
16. But see generally Mishran Wroe, Preemption of Municipal Crime-Free Housing
Ordinances, 2 TENN. J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. 123 (2014) (arguing that the Fair Housing
Act preempts crime-free ordinances); Nicole Livanos, Crime-Free Housing Ordinances: One
Call Away From Eviction, 19 PUB. INT. L. REP. 106 (2014) (discussing the impact of crime-free
ordinances on victims of crime).
17. For instance, Professor Ethan Leib notes that “legal scholars have almost universally
ignored the law in local courts, favoring the study of federal courts and state appellate courts.”
Ethan J. Leib, Localist Statutory Interpretation, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 898–99 (2013).
18. Fortunately, new online databases like Municode are opening up research possibilities
in local law. See Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1109,
1125 (2012).
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invisible.” Because it appears in many different contexts, and
sometimes merely repurposes old laws that were originally enacted
for other reasons, third-party policing has only just begun to attract
20
the scholarly attention of a few pioneering academics. Third-party
policing practices are ubiquitous, but its emergence as an “articulated
or developed doctrine” is still in its infancy, and while the literature is
growing, there has not yet been widespread examination of third21
party policing activities and practices.
This Article offers an examination and excavation of the
nationwide trend of cities and towns enacting ordinances that use
vicarious liability to hold household and family members responsible
for the actions of others. These laws can be understood as “home rule
ordinances,” a term that highlights three important features shared by
these ordinances. First, home rule ordinances create a new standard
of home governance that parents and heads of household must meet
to avoid legal sanction. In other words, the ordinances create a set of
“home rules” that apply to the internal workings of home life.
Second, they establish rules about who gets to have a home at all; that
is, they serve as a sorting rule, setting parameters for homeworthiness in a broader sense. The ability to keep one’s home
becomes contingent on one’s ability to control the behavior of
another person, and if a tenant fails to demonstrate such control,
22
eviction can follow. And, finally, the ordinances are home rule
ordinances in another, more literal sense: they typically rely on a
23
city’s home rule authority for their existence. Home rule ordinances

19. MAZEROLLE & RANSLEY, supra note 5, at 50.
20. Such academics include Michael Buerger, Reinier Kraakman, Lorraine Mazerolle, and
Janet Ransley. Other scholars have used different terminology to describe the same or similar
phenomena, such as “plural policing” or “third-party liability systems.” See, for example, Ian
Loader, Plural Policing and Democratic Governance, 9 SOC. & LEG. STUD. 323, 324 (2000)
(plural policing) and Gilboy, supra note 8, at 135 (third-party liability systems).
21. MAZEROLLE & RANSLEY, supra note 5, at 50.
22. For low-income tenants, evictions often result in homelessness. See infra text
accompanying notes 271–98. The use of home rule ordinances as a mechanism for displacing
people has important implications for housing discrimination. As Desmond and others write,
“Our efforts to monitor and reduce housing discrimination have been almost entirely
concentrated on getting in; we have overlooked, meanwhile, the process of getting (put) out.”
Matthew Desmond, Weihua An, Richelle Winkler & Thomas Ferriss, Evicting Children, 92 SOC.
FORCES 303, 304 (2013).
23. Home rule can be understood as a method by which state governments can transfer
power to local governments, thereby allowing local governments “autonomy in the management
of their local affairs.” James D. Cole, Constitutional Home Rule in New York: ‘The Ghost of
Home Rule,’ 59 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 713, 713 n.1 (1985).
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are passed as part of a city’s power to regulate its own local or
municipal affairs, and have faced challenges on the basis that they
24
exceed the grant of home rule authority.
This Article argues that although these home rule ordinances
seem to hold some initial appeal, they are deeply problematic. They
place an undue burden on familial and intimate relationships,
undermine our legal, cultural, and aspirational notions of home, and
represent an attempt by municipalities to regulate highly intimate
spaces and alter people’s home lives. Through these ordinances, cities
coerce friends and family members into serving as “‘intimate
handler[s],’” and into becoming part of “networks of security
25
production.” This “networked governance” governs both the
26
watchers and the watched, and has important implications for
privacy, for parenting rights, for who can establish a home, and for
how people must parent.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I situates home rule
ordinances in the context of third-party policing, and describes how a
series of shifts in governance created a political landscape in which
third-party policing measures could flourish. Part II describes how
home rule ordinances establish the home as a site of risk
management, crime prevention, and security production, compelling
parents and heads of household to engage in a variety of surveillance
and compliance behaviors. Part III explores the role of vicarious
liability, fault, and vulnerability in home rule ordinances. Next, Part
IV considers the consequences of noncompliance with home rule
ordinances, including stigma, fines, and eviction. Part V first considers
the current legal avenues for challenging home rule ordinances. Part
V then argues that cities should consider moving away from home
rule ordinances, and offers some alternative interventions that cities
could employ to address the broader, structural issues often
underlying problems involving misconduct, criminality, and drug use.
The Article concludes by suggesting that home rule ordinances
are transforming the “right to maintain control” over one’s home into
a duty to control all the people connected to that home, and deter

24. See infra note 335.
25. Marcus Felson, Routine Activities and Crime Prevention in the Developing Metropolis,
25 CRIMINOLOGY 911, 912 (1987); Jennifer Wood, Networked Policing for the Future 1 (June 1,
2005), http://www.researchgate.net/publication/265303410_Networked_Policing_for_the_Future.
26. Wood, supra note 25.

SWAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1/26/2015 11:38 PM

830

[Vol. 64:823

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
27

them from engaging in wrongful conduct. Such a duty is likely
impossible to fulfill, and the attempt to comply with it can fracture
familial and social bonds in ways that actually contribute to, rather
than prevent, the social problems that initially prompted these
ordinances.
I. THIRD-PARTY POLICING AS A RESPONSE TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS
This Part describes how third-party policing came to be a
popular response to many social issues. Part I.A chronicles the growth
of third-party policing out of a series of shifts in governance. With the
late modern state’s shift from sovereignty to governmentality, and
from welfarism to neoliberalism, crime has emerged as a new
paradigm for governance. The criminal paradigm is now applied in a
variety of contexts, including the context of social issues that used to
lie outside of its purview. Crime fighting also encompasses a variety
of new tools. One of these new tools is a focus on the potential of
third parties to control crime. Home rule ordinances are part of this
trend.
Part I.B offers a more detailed sketch of each of the three types
of ordinances that comprise the new home rules: parental liability
ordinances, crime-free lease ordinances, and nuisance ordinances.
These ordinances use strict vicarious liability to hold a parent or head
of household responsible for the wrongful actions of another
household member.
A. The Rise of Third-Party Policing
In modern Western societies, legal norms have traditionally been
28
enforced through direct deterrence. Lately, though, in their struggle
to address complex social problems, governments at all levels are
29
turning to third-party policing. Third-party policing tries to deter
unlawful conduct by coercing a third party into performing activities
30
that will discourage a potential primary wrongdoer. To motivate
private parties to perform these policing duties upon primary

27. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993); see JavinskyWenzek v. City of St. Louis Park, 829 F. Supp. 2d 787, 797 (D. Minn. 2011) (quoting James
Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 53).
28. Kraakman, supra note 6, at 56; see Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 516 (2001) (“The
normal method of deterring unlawful conduct is to punish the person engaging in it.”).
29. MAZEROLLE & RANSLEY, supra note 5, at 2–3.
30. Id.
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wrongdoers, third-party policing relies on a number of “legal levers”:
regulatory, civil, or criminal sanctions that befall those who fail to
31
police properly.
Third-party policing is now used to solve myriad “pressing social
32
problems,” at local, national, and international levels. For instance,
if juvenile vandalism or destruction of property is a problem in a
particular community, that community may try to hold the parents
33
liable for the costs of that damage. Similarly, if sweatshop factories
are an issue for a particular nation, that nation may hold
manufacturers liable for their subcontractors’ violations of federal
laws, and may also co-opt retailers into the policing project to
34
decrease the end market for these products. The key is that a third
party, thought to have some means of controlling the actions of a
targeted party, is compelled by the threat of legal sanction to perform
policing activities that could accomplish this goal.
The growing popularity of third-party policing as a solution to
35
social problems can be traced to three shifts in modern governance.
36
First, there is a “movement from sovereignty to governmentality.”
Under sovereignty, the state used “force and domination” to maintain
37
its power both on the international stage and within its own borders.
Under governmentality, however, the state uses a different set of
tools. Instead of force and domination, governmentality relies on
38
subtler “technologies of governance.” These tools are “more diffuse
and spread over institutions both of the state and civil society” and
39
result in “individuals governing themselves” and one another.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Gilboy, supra note 8, at 140.
Id.
Id.
MAZEROLLE & RANSLEY, supra note 5, at 5.
Id. at 7 (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON (1st ed. 1977)).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 13; see James Hay, Unaided Virtues: The (Neo)Liberalization of the Domestic
Sphere and the New Architecture of Community, in MICHEL FOUCAULT, CULTURAL STUDIES,
AND GOVERNMENTALITY 165, 166 (Jack Z. Bratich, Jeremy Packer & Cameron McCarthy eds.,
2003) (discussing how the government “came to rely less upon political institutions . . . and to
develop techniques for governing at a distance” by using practices that individuals “in their
freedom can use in dealing with each other”); Ronen Shamir, The Age of Responsibilization: On
Market-Embedded Morality, 37 ECON. & SOC’Y 1, 8 (2008) (“[R]esponsibilization operates at
the level of individual actors . . . to mobilize designated actors actively to undertake and
perform self-governing tasks.”).
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The configuration of individuals as “responsible for their own
governance” is also part of a second political shift, from “welfarism to
40
neoliberalism.” Under neoliberalism, individuals are not controlled
or policed in the traditional sense. Instead, they are recruited into
41
policing and regulating themselves and others. These duties are
justified not only on the grounds of ability—that is, the idea that
members of the community could and therefore should prevent
42
crime—but also on the grounds of responsibility.
“‘[T]he
community’” becomes “‘the all-purpose solution’” to every social
issue, not only because community members can help prevent crime
and related problems, “but also because some were found to be
43
responsible for it.”
Professor David Garland’s theory of “responsibilization” helps
44
explain how this works. He notes that in managing populations,
governments now tend to act not directly, through their own state
45
agencies, but instead indirectly, through nonstate actors. As he puts
it, the current “primary concern” of government is “to devolve
responsibility for crime prevention on to agencies, organizations and
individuals which are quite outside the state and to persuade them to
46
act appropriately.” Ultimately, the state “is seeking to implement
‘social’ and ‘situational’ forms of crime prevention which involve the
re-ordering of the conduct of everyday life right across the social
47
field,” including the home. Whereas the state’s initial target for
40. MAZEROLLE & RANSLEY, supra note 5, at 23. The authors describe how between
World War II and the 1960s, “the dominant Western framework was a Keynesian one, where
the welfarist state operated through the government to control and regulate the economy,
society and the provision of services to the community. In this conception of the state,
government is everything and all social, economic, regulatory and political action occurs within
its framework.” Id. at 8.
41. Mele, supra note 11, at 130. Also, “[a]t the urban level, neoliberalism has important
implications for the spatial development and governance of cities, which in turn affect patterns
of crime, governance of police departments, and policing strategies and priorities.” Jeremy
Kaplan-Lyman, Note, A Punitive Bind: Policing, Poverty, and Neoliberalism in New York City,
15 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 177, 180 (2012); see Ian Loader, Plural Policing and
Democratic Governance, 9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 323, 324 (2000) (“We inhabit a world of plural,
networked policing.”).
42. Matthew Desmond & Nicol Valdez, Unpolicing the Urban Poor: Consequences of
Third-Party Policing for Inner-City Women, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 117, 119 (2013).
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. David Garland, The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in
Contemporary Society, 36 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 445, 452 (1996).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 454.
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transformative action was the individual wrongdoer, it now seeks to
alter “the norms, the routines, and the consciousness of everyone,” in
order to make crime prevention a part of everyone’s quotidian
48
culture and practice.
Indeed, a third shift in modern governance is that crime itself has
49
become a mode of governance in America. Beginning in the 1960s,
the United States has increasingly engaged in “governing through
50
crime.”
The tools of criminal law, like “criminalization,
incarceration, [and] police intervention,” are brought in as the answer
to nearly every social problem, even those once considered well
51
beyond the reach of criminal law. Crime control has infiltrated areas
and zones of personal lives that were once believed to be largely
outside its scope, and has become “the funnel through which all other
52
policy interventions flow.” It is now “the central metaphor through
which government intervention and coercion is justified” and
53
rationalized.
In addition to the ever-expanding scope of criminal law, the
kinds of interventions and coercive tools used in the name of fighting
crime have become more diverse over time. For instance, civil
remedies are now also often used in service of crime control. In the
1980s, problem-oriented policing started using civil ordinances to
54
accomplish its goals, a practice that has continued to grow. Civil
ordinances provide the criminal law with an even greater sphere of
impact and are able to access areas of private life that were once
55
unavailable to it. The National Institute of Justice, for instance,
suggests that “one of the most important advantages of using civil
remedies” is their ability to reach “beyond the scope of the criminal
56
law” and control behavior that the criminal law could not access.

48. Id.
49. See generally JONATHON SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME (2009) (asserting that
since the 1960s, communities have slowly become governed through crime).
50. Id. at 1.
51. Levy, supra note 12, at 539. The school-to-prison pipeline is a good example of the
expanding reach of the criminal law. School-to-Prison Pipeline, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/school-prison-pipeline (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
52. Levy, supra note 12, at 577; see also Kaplan-Lyman, supra note 41, at 180.
53. Kaplan-Lyman, supra note 41, at 188.
54. Michael E. Buerger, The Politics of Third-Party Policing, 9 CRIME PREVENTION STUD.
89, 91 (1998).
55. For a description of this expansion of criminal law, see generally SIMON, supra note 49.
56. Levy, supra note 12, at 577.
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Many of the civil ordinances that are used in service of the
criminal law concern land. In fact, crime management has recently
turned away from traditional enforcement methods and toward “land
57
management responses.” One legal scholar suggests that this shift is
the result of “[t]he Warren Court’s ‘criminal procedure revolution,’”
which placed constitutional limits on how police could impose social
58
order. Land-management solutions like “stricter housing codes,
trespass zoning, and homeless campuses,” which avoid such
procedural and constitutional complications, thereby became an
59
attractive option for policymakers. Accordingly, the application of
civil-law tools like “nuisance abatement, forfeiture, and eviction” to
problems originally approached through the criminal law has been
60
dramatically increasing.
The shifts from sovereignty to governmentality, from welfarism
to neoliberalism, and from traditional law-enforcement techniques to
land-management tools have generated third-party policing as an
important new technology of governance, one that is frequently relied
61
upon as part of the state’s crime-fighting apparatus. Indeed, “the
extensive use of third parties” has become “[o]ne of the most striking
62
features of contemporary social regulation.” Many of these thirdparty policing schemes compel multiple third parties to perform
policing duties.
As the new focus on land-management responses suggests, thirdparty policing often involves monitoring and obtaining control over a
63
specific geographical site. A common example of this form of thirdparty policing involves taverns or bars. Usually, after discovering a
problem associated with a particular drinking establishment, such as
drunk and disorderly patrons, the police will ask the third party to
perform some activity that is not normally part of its business
57. Id. at 548 n.61 (citing Nicole Stelle Garnett, Relocating Disorder, 91 VA. L. REV. 1075,
1078 (2005)). Examples of land-management responses include “stricter housing codes, trespass
zoning, and homeless campuses.” Id.
58. Garnett, supra note 57, at 1082.
59. Levy, supra note 12, at 548 n.61 (citing Garnett, supra note 57, at 1082).
60. Id. at 549.
61. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 117–18.
62. Gilboy, supra note 8, at 137. Historically, policing was actually an activity performed by
citizens, as “[e]very man had a responsibility to secure his own neighborhood through the
obligation to join in the ‘hue and cry’ and to keep in his house a stash of arms for the specific
purpose of maintaining the peace.” Julie Ayling & Peter Grabosky, Policing by Command:
Enhancing Law Enforcement Capacity Through Coercion, 28 LAW & POL’Y 420, 421 (2006).
63. MAZEROLLE & RANSLEY, supra note 5, at 84.

SWAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

1/26/2015 11:38 PM

HOME RULES

835

64

practices. This action can be a change to the physical environment,
like constructing a barrier, adding lighting, or installing more access
controls, or it can be a change to business behaviors, like adopting
screening protocols for tenants or implementing rules of conduct for
65
66
patrons. If the third party accedes to the request, all is well. If not, a
67
“legal lever” will be deployed to coerce compliance. For instance,
bar owners who fail to make the requested change may “find
themselves the subject of an unscheduled health or building code
68
inspection, or other regulatory action.”
Another popular legal lever is the extension of liability from the
primary wrongdoer to the secondary wrongdoer—a “gatekeeper” or
“enabler”—who has the ability to “disrupt the wrongdoing” by either
69
withholding services or performing some other preventive measure.
A common example of gatekeeping liability occurs when lawyers or
accountants are held liable for the fraudulent security transactions of
70
their clients.
Although there is not yet much hard data studying the
71
effectiveness of third-party policing, these schemes have been
72
rapidly replicating and reproducing themselves. This is a common
occurrence in lawmaking:

64. Michael Buerger, Third-Party Policing: Futures and Evolutions, in POLICING 2020:
EXPLORING THE FUTURE OF CRIME, COMMUNITIES, AND POLICING 452, 454 (Joseph A.
Schafer ed., 2007).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 454–56.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 455.
69. Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 365 (2003).
70. Id. The police or state actors have only a minor role in this version of third-party
policing, generally consisting of “educating third parties about their potential liability or ways to
reduce it.” MAZEROLLE & RANSLEY, supra note 5, at 95.
71. Mazerolle and Ransley note that “very little discourse surrounds third party policing
activities and there exists very little systematic assessment of third party policing practices.” Id.
at 50. Similarly, Professor Greg Koehle states that “very little research has been conducted on
third party policing programs, and even less on the party expected to fulfill the third party
policing role.” Greg Koehle, Controlling Crime and Disorder in Rental Properties: The
Perspective of the Rental Property Manager, 14 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 53, 54 (2013).
72. For a detailed account of the increasing prevalence of third-party policing, see
generally MAZEROLLE & RANSLEY, supra note 5. As another example, the city of Escondido,
California, enacted an ordinance entitled “Establishing Penalties for the Harboring of Illegal
Aliens in the City of Escondido.” Under this ordinance, landlords who “let, lease[d], or rent[ed]
a dwelling unit to an illegal alien, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has
come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law” would face civil and
criminal sanctions. See Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1048 (2006).
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Political scientists have noted the interesting phenomenon in
legislative activity that over time certain notions or ways of dealing
with problems become prominent (perhaps in part because of
perceptions of their past success in solving problems) and these
solutions come to be attached by decision makers to a wide range of
73
problems as they come to their attention.

Cities have been particularly keen on turning to third-party
74
policing as a solution to social problems. Perhaps surprisingly, in an
era of globalization and the simultaneous rise of both nation-states
and supranational governing bodies, the role of local governments
75
and municipalities has not been diminished. On the contrary, there is
a growing “dialectical relationship” between local governments and
these larger bodies of governance, such that local governments have
managed to “not only persist in the age of ‘globalization’ but to
76
actually acquire importance and new . . . powers.”
Local governments, seeking to address social issues like bullying,
drug abuse, and other criminal or undesirable behaviors, are
increasingly turning to third-party policing as the answer. Continuing
the new tradition of characterizing social problems as criminal issues,
cities and municipalities across the nation are increasingly enacting
ordinances that piggyback onto criminal behaviors and require third
parties to monitor and control the behavior of others.
In particular, cities are increasingly pushing third-party policing
77
into the home and using it as a tool to govern households. Initially,
73. Gilboy, supra note 8, at 139.
74. Professor Jeffrey Parness states that cities have also been using third-party policing for
more mundane purposes, like municipal automated-traffic-enforcement schemes. Under this
form of enforcement, cameras capture driving infractions and the city issues tickets to vehicle
owners, regardless of who was driving at the time of the infraction. This results in a “form of
strict liability for secondary culprits,’ those owning the vehicles.” Jeffrey A. Parness, Beyond
Red Light Enforcement Against the Guilty But Innocent: Local Regulations of Secondary
Culprits, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 259, 259 (2011). The justification for this imposition is that
the “secondary culprits” have some “ability to control the ‘primary culprits,’ those using the
vehicles,” and should use that ability to ensure adherence to the rules of the road. Id. This
system of regulation mimics the principal’s liability doctrine found in tort law.
75. Mariana Valverde, Seeing Like a City: The Dialectic of Modern and Premodern Ways of
Seeing in Urban Governance, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 277, 307 (2011).
76. Id. at 307–08 (noting that this is “in part because of their ability to serve new functions
and become a tool of global rather than local capital”).
77. Perhaps surprisingly, the very idea of policing has deep historical and etymological
connections to both households and third parties. For much of “Western political history,”
“police” referred not to uniformed individuals who drive squad cars and arrest people, but
instead to “the hierarchical mode of governance in which the polis is treated as a household
rather than a gathering of autonomous equals.” Alec C. Ewald, Collateral Consequences, in
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in the middle of the last century, municipalities tried to police social
disorder by focusing on outside spaces, through ordinances such as
78
vagrancy and loitering laws. However, in the 1960s courts began
79
striking down these laws, so cities began refocusing the attention
from external to internal spaces, and “reached into a sector
80
previously untouched by vagrancy laws: the home.” Cities “were
able to do so, in part, because the recent criminalization of domestic
violence allowed—indeed, required—the expansion of criminal law
81
into private space.” Once the home had been opened up to legal
intervention in this way, other criminal and civil laws entered the
home, a space the legal system had begun to envision as not solely
82
private, but instead “‘in need of public control, like the streets.’”
Cities began to focus on curing disorder inside the home, and
intervening in that formerly private space, in order to promote the
broader goal of order and security in the city.
B. The Home Rule Ordinances
Home rule ordinances have emerged from this overall landscape.
They follow this tradition of envisioning homes “‘as in need of public
control’” in order to promote the interests of reducing crime and
83
increasing security. The ordinances are designed with “the selfconscious purpose of leveraging familial solidarity” to both directly

LAW AS PUNISHMENT / LAW AS REGULATION 77–123, 105 (Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas &
Martha Merrill Umphrey eds., 2011) (citing Markus D. Dubber, Regulatory and Legal Aspects
of Penalty, in LAW AS PUNISHMENT / LAW AS REGULATION, supra, at 19, 19–49 (Austin Sarat,
Lawrence Douglas & Martha Merrill Umphrey eds., 2011)). Further, prior to the establishment
of modern police forces, “‘policing’ itself was a third-party obligation, imposed or offered to
citizens.” Buerger, supra note 64, at 458.
78. See Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 120.
79. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983) (placing constitutional
limitations on loitering statutes); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972)
(striking down a vagrancy ordinance); Parker v. Mun. Judge, 427 P.2d 642, 643–44 (Nev. 1967)
(holding the ordinance unconstitutional because it punished the status of poverty).
80. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 120 (quotation mark omitted).
81. Id. (citing Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2 (2006)). It should
be noted, however, that the focus on homes is in addition to, not instead of, the focus on public
spaces. Cities continue to engage in “urban social control” through regulating public spaces,
through now they often rely on new legal mechanisms to do so. See Katherine Beckett & Steve
Herbert, Dealing with Disorder: Social Control in the Post-Industrial City, 12 THEORETICAL
CRIMINOLOGY 5, 6 (2008).
82. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 120 (quoting JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE
LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 11 (2009)).
83. Id.
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and indirectly deter potential wrongdoers. The possibility of a
negative impact on friends and family members is meant to directly
dissuade potential wrongdoers from engaging in unlawful behaviors.
At the same time, the ordinances are also meant to indirectly deter
wrongdoing, by eliciting a series of behaviors from those friends and
85
family members that will ward against criminal activity. Family
members and friends are thereby implicated “in the responsibility and
86
liability for the management” of the risk of wrongdoing. The three
ordinances discussed below—parental liability ordinances, crime-free
lease ordinances, and nuisance ordinances—attempt to achieve the
goal of public security by controlling “not just individual behaviors,”
but also “broader social arrangements—where and how people
87
live.”
1. Parental Liability Ordinances. Desperate to stop youth
bullying and the suicides connected to it, many cities are now passing
or considering passing ordinances that hold parents responsible for
88
their children’s bullying or other wrongdoing. Bullying and

84. Levinson, supra note 69, at 413.
85. Id. (discussing the federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which was “designed to
conscript family members to police and prevent their relatives’ criminal behavior”).
86. Mele, supra note 11, at 130.
87. Levy, supra note 12, at 540.
88. At the time of this writing, the cities that have passed ordinances holding parents
vicariously liable for their children’s bullying behavior include Monona, Wisconsin (population
7715, a suburb of Madison); Detroit, Michigan (population 701,475); Village of Mount Horeb,
Wisconsin (population 7294) (using the same language as the Monona ordinance); and Kansas
City, Missouri (population 464,310). See DETROIT, MICH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 33-3-44
(2011); KANSAS CITY, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 50-244 (2013); MONONA, WIS., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 11-2-17 (2013); MOUNT HOREB, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES 2013-14 (2013).
Population numbers are taken from CITY DATA, http://www.city-data.com (last visited Jan. 17,
2015).
Carson City, California (population 93,000), voted on but ultimately rejected such an
ordinance. Part of the opposition to the bill was based on the idea that it could be used in a
racially discriminatory manner, to “further criminalize Black and Brown youth.” Charlene
Muhammad, Punishing Bullies or Targeting Black Youth?, FINAL CALL (May 22, 2014, 9:19
AM), http://www.finalcall.com/artman/publish/National_News_2/article_101450.shtml. The
ordinance called for a one-hundred-dollar fine for the first violation, two hundred dollars for the
second, and “a fine and counseling for the entire family” following a third violation. Id. The law
also provided that “[a]nyone between 18-25 who participates in or encourages bullying or
cyberbullying would also face misdemeanor charges.” Id. Benton Harbor, Michigan (population
10,040), also considered a bullying ordinance that would hold parents liable for their children’s
bullying. First offences would require community service, and subsequent offenses would attract
fines of seventy-four to five hundred dollars. That proposal is currently tabled. Barbara
Harrington, Proposed Anti-Bullying Ordinance Carries Strict Punishments, WNDU.COM (Dec.
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“bullycides” are now a major social issue across the nation and
89
frequently dominate news headlines. A recent Psychology Today
article describes the coverage and scope of the problem: “It’s
relentless. Virtually every week the media informs us about another
new tragedy of a young person taking his or her own life because they
90
could no longer tolerate being bullied.” Bullying is understood in the
popular imagination to be an extremely common and extremely
dangerous social problem among kids and teens. The American
Medical Association states that 3.2 million children have been bullied,
and other studies suggest that 42 percent of children have
91
experienced online bullying.
Celebrities and not-for-profit
organizations have launched a number of campaigns to combat the

18, 2013, 11:50 PM), http://www.wndu.com/home/headlines/Proposed-anti-bullying-ordinancecarries-strict-punishments--236489351.html.
Milton, Wisconsin (population 5549), has a bullying ordinance that holds only the child,
not the parent accountable. See Eric Schulzke, Could Bullying and Harassment Become a
Criminal Offense?, DESERT NEWS NAT’L (May 22, 2014), http://national.deseretnews
.com/article/1526/Could-bullying-and-harassment-become-a-criminal-offense.html. Marshfield,
Massachusetts (population 24,324), and Dexter, Missouri (population 7864), have similar
ordinances. See Jonathon Dawe, Ballot Issue Won’t Change Procedure for DPD, DAILY
STATESMAN (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.dailystatesman.com/story/2105774.html; Raymond
Neupert, Marshfield Passes Cyber Bullying Ordinance, WDEZ (Apr. 18, 2011, 3:00 AM), http://
wdez.com/news/articles/2011/apr/18/marshfield-passes-cyber-bullying-ordinance. A nonparental
bullying ordinance was also considered in East Greenwich, Rhode Island (population 13,146).
See Barbara Polichetti, East Greenwich, RI Considers Anti-Bullying Ordinance, E. GREENWICH
F.A.C.E.S. (Jan. 27, 2011, 10:50 PM), http://www.eastgreenwichfaces.org/apps/blog/show/
5966854-east-greenwich-ri-considers-anti-bullying-ordinance.
89. For examples of these headlines, see Jeff Coltin, Strike a Chord: Does Bullying Cause
Suicide?, WFUV.ORG (Nov. 6, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.wfuv.org/news/news-politics/141106/
strike-chord-does-bullying-cause-suicide; Corinne Lestch, Distraught South Carolina Mom Says
Bullying Drove Son To Commit Suicide, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 21, 2014, 4:38 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/south-carolina-mom-bullying-drove-son-commitsuicide-article-1.2019446; Chris Minor, Local Parents Combat “Suicide by Bullying” After 12Year-Old Daughter’s Death, WQAD8 (Nov. 6, 2014, 10:00 PM), http://wqad.com/2014/
11/06/local-parents-combat-suicide-by-bullying-after-12-year-old-daughters-death. The term
“bullycide” was coined in NEIL MARR & TIM FIELD, BULLYCIDE: DEATH AT PLAYTIME 1
(2001). It is a controversial term, as it seems to ignore the intervening act of the victim’s suicide,
instead attributing that act to the bully’s wrongdoing. Bullycide, STOP BULLYCIDE NOW (May
16, 2014), http://stopbullycidenow.weebly.com/observation-blog-entry/bullycide.
90. Izzy Kalman, Why Are So Many Kids Committing Bullycide?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Jan.
11, 2012), http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/psychological-solution-bullying/201201/whyare-so-many-kids-committing-bullycide.
91. Kathy Quinn, KCMO Council Passes Anti-Bullying Ordinance That Fines Parents for
Kids’ Bullying, FOX4KC.COM (Aug. 15, 2013, 8:35 AM), http://fox4kc.com/2013/08/15/kcmocouncil-considers-anti-bullying-ordinance-that-fines-parents-for-kids-bullying.
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problem, and the law continues to explore the role and
92
responsibilities of schools and parents in combatting bullying.
At the state level, many legislatures are exploring the potential
of parental liability statutes to address the problem. For instance,
following the bullying-related suicide of twelve-year-old Rebecca
Sedwick, some Florida lobbyists are attempting to craft legislation
that would hold parents criminally liable for their children’s bullying
93
behavior. Also, in Iowa, a bill imposing parental liability for bullying
94
behavior was drafted and proposed. The rationale underlying these
proposed state laws is that poor parenting causes juvenile
95
misconduct. Proponents of these laws believe that “parents will
spend more time and effort in monitoring the activities of their
children if they know they will be held responsible for their children’s
actions,” and that this monitoring will be an effective deterrent to
96
bullying.
Not content to wait for the sometimes laborious political process
to work itself out at the state level, however, cities have forged ahead

92. For example, activists Dan Savage and Terry Miller started the It Gets Better Project
(www.itgetsbetter.org), a web-based campaign focused on helping gay youths who experience
bullying. What is the It Gets Better Project?, IT GETS BETTER PROJECT (last visited Jan. 16,
2015).
93. Bullying Felony Charges Right or Wrong?, USATODAY (Oct. 20, 2013, 5:10 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/10/20/cyber-bullying-rebecca-sedwick-chargesflorida-column/3110697.
94. H.F. 143, 2013 Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2013), available at http://coolice.legis.iowa
.gov/Cool-ICE/default.asp?Category=billinfo&Service=Billbook&menu=false&hbill=hf143;
Heather Leigh, Iowa Bill Could Hold Parents Responsible for Bullying, SIOUXLAND NEWS,
http://www.siouxlandnews.com/story/17590770/iowa-bill-could-hold-parents-responsible-forbullying (last visited Jan. 16, 2015); Mike Wiser, Branstad Sees Hope in Another Anti-Bullying
Summit, SIOUX CITY JOURNAL (July 7, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://siouxcityjournal.com/news/
local/a1/branstad-sees-hope-in-another-anti-bullying-summit/article_69a59e21-8b70-573d-b5fc95773d8dc003.html. It ultimately failed to pass during the 2014 legislative session. Connie Ryan
Terrel, Slate Needs to Try Again on Anti-Bullying Bill, DES MOINES REGISTER (May 24, 2014,
11:17 PM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/columnists/iowa-view/2014/05/25/
state-try-bullying-bill/9561923.
95. This is not a new idea. As Professor Leslie John Harris notes, “Family historian John
Demos traced the antecedents of contemporary parental responsibility statutes at least to the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when poor parents would be summoned to court,
admonished, and if they did not improve, have their children taken away.” Leslie Joan Harris,
An Empirical Study of Parental Responsibility Laws: Sending Messages, but What Kind and To
Whom?, 1 UTAH L. REV. 5, 7 (2006).
96. Parental Liability Laws, JOHN HOWARD SOC’Y OF ALTA., http://www.johnhoward.
ab.ca/pub/C11.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2015). For a discussion of the similar reasoning
underlying parental liability laws in tort, see generally Elizabeth G. Porter, Tort Liability in the
Age of the Helicopter Parent, 64 ALA. L. REV. 533 (2013).
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with their own ordinances. In June 2013, the city of Monona,
Wisconsin, attracted widespread media attention when it passed a city
ordinance holding parents liable for their children’s bullying
97
behaviors. The ordinance offers a definition of bullying and other
prohibited behaviors, and then provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful
for any custodial parent or guardian of any unemancipated person
under eighteen (18) years of age to allow or permit such person to
98
violate the provision[ ][prohibiting bullying] above.”
Under the Monona ordinance, parents who violate the provision
may be fined between $50 and $1000 (“plus ‘the costs of
prosecution’”) for a first offense, and double that for additional
99
violations. According to Monona’s police chief, the fines will be
levied only in situations in which the parents are uncooperative and
100
do not make an effort to address the bullying. Other cities have
followed Monona’s lead. For example, in Kansas City, Missouri, the
97. Carol Kuruvilla, Parents of Bullies in Wisconsin Town to Be Fined for Their Kids’ Bad
Behavior, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 4, 2013, 5:27 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/
national/parents-bullies-fined-kids-behavior-article-1.1363172. No parents had been fined under
the ordinance as of April 25, 2014. Parents Learn About Monona Bullying Ordinance,
MCFARLAND THISTLE (Apr. 25, 2014, 6:15 AM), http://www.hngnews.com/mcfarland
_thistle/news/local/article74497836-cb06-11e3-9d87-001a4bcf6878.html.
However,
Monona
Police Det. Sgt. Ryan Losby, who spearheaded the efforts to enact the ordinance, believes that
its presence on the books has been an effective deterrent, because “no one wants to fork out
$144 for no reason.” Id. The town of McFarland, Wisconsin, was interested in passing a similar
ordinance, though the police chief there expressed concerns with the potential legality, and
advocated for “in-depth family counseling and behavior modification training” as a better
alternative. Id.
98. MONONA, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 11-2-17 (2013). The ordinance also states
that notice serves as a rebuttable presumption that a parent allowed or permitted the bullying:
The fact that prior to the present offense a parent, guardian or custodian was
informed in writing by a law enforcement officer of a separate violation of [the
provision prohibiting bullying] by the same minor occurring within ninety (90) days
prior to the present offense shall constitute a rebuttable presumption that such
parent, guardian or custodian allowed or permitted the present violation.
Id. Presumably, a parent could rebut the presumption with evidence that she took reasonable
steps to prohibit the behavior. In a similar instance, a court held that a statute that created
parental liability for a child’s wrongful act, subject to the defense that the “person took
reasonable steps to control the conduct of the child at the time” in question, was still vicarious
liability because there was no identifiable act or omission that served as the predicate for
culpability. See City of Maple Heights v. Ephraim, 898 N.E.2d 974, 978 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).
99. Eugene Volokh, Ban on Behavior That “Emotionally Abuse[s]” or “Is Likely to Create
an Offensive Environment” and “Which Serves No Legitimate Purpose” + Liability for Parents
Who “Allow” Such Speech, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 3, 2013, 2:30 PM), http://www.volokh
.com/2013/06/03/ban-on-behavior-that-emotionally-abuses-or-is-likely-to-create-an-offensiveenvironment-and-which-serves-no-legitimate-purpose-liability-for-parents-who-allow-suchspeech.
100. Id.
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city council approved an ordinance that would see parents of bullies
fined up to $1000, unless they enrolled their child in an antibullying
101
program.
The path to ordinances targeting bullying has been paved by
102
other cities enacting more generalized parental liability statutes. In
the 1990s, many states and municipalities began passing such
103
ordinances. Many of these ordinances eliminated the parentalintent requirement that was present in older parental liability laws,
104
and imposed a strict-liability standard instead.
One of the first cities to start this trend was Silverton, Oregon.
Silverton passed a law that charges parents with the misdemeanor
101. The Kansas City Ordinance states:
It shall be unlawful for the parent, guardian or other person having custody or control
of a minor to permit, or by insufficient control to allow, such minor to bully or cyberbully another minor. Upon conviction of a violation of this subsection, a parent,
guardian or other person having custody or control of the minor shall be subject to a
fine not to exceed $1,000.00 and costs. In lieu of a fine, the court may impose
probation provided that a condition of probation is attendance in an available antibullying program either provided by the school district wherein resides the convicted
parent, guardian or other person having custody or control of the minor or provided
by a group or entity approved by the court.
KANSAS CITY, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 50-244 (2013). See Quinn, supra note 91. Kansas
City has also implemented the crime-free housing program. See Crime Free Testimonials: Keep
Illegal Activity Off Rental Property, INT’L CRIME FREE ASS’N, http://www.crime-freeassociation.org/testimonials.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2015); infra text accompanying notes 119–
38.
102. Collins et al., supra note 15, at 1340. The authors note the fact that these laws are
created at the local level means that they are “difficult to survey,” and “scholarly estimates” of
their prevalence and scope are virtually nonexistent. Id. Nevertheless, this Article suggests that
media reports and tools like Municode offer at least an overgeneralized picture of what is
happening.
103. In 1996, a New York Times article noted the “proliferation of ‘dozens’ of ordinances in
towns near Chicago in the ‘last two years.’” Id. at 1341 n.61 (quoting Peter Applebome, Parents
Face Consequences as Children’s Misdeeds Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1996, at A1). Parental
responsibility laws parallel those in jurisdictions like “Central America, South America, and
Europe,” where there is a “‘cultural emphasis on family solidarity,’” rather than “‘the high value
the common law places on individualism.’” Dimitris, supra note 11, at 662. It appears that the
public perception of an increase in juvenile crime in the 1990s was not based in fact: overall,
juvenile crime actually declined by 30 percent from 1993 to 1998. Barton, supra note 11, at 879.
104. Portia Allen-Kyle, Note, Women at the Forefront: An Examination of the Disparate
Exposure of Mothers to Liability Under Parental Responsibility Laws, EXPRESSO (2013),
available at http://works.bepress.com/portia_allen-kyle. The older parental liability laws
expanded the parental liability available at common law. Historically, in tort law, parents were
generally “not liable for the acts of their child[ren].” Dimitris, supra note 11, at 662. There were
four main exceptions to this general rule. Liability could attach if parents “directed or
subsequently ratified the act[s]”; if the child “was acting as the parent’s agent or servant”; if the
child was “entrusted with a dangerous instrumentality, such as a gun, or was negligently given
access to an automobile”; or if “the parents’ negligence was a proximate cause of the harm.” Id.
at 662, 663.
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offense of “‘failing to supervise a minor’” whenever a child or youth
105
violates a provision of the Silverton Municipal Code. The violations
that trigger parental liability under the ordinance include acts as
106
minor as cigarette smoking. The ordinance allows fines of parents
107
even for a first offense of children up to the age of eighteen.
According to the mayor of Silverton, the law has been effective
because “‘[w]hen their parents are being dragged into it, most kids . . .
realize they’re not the only ones who pay the price for their actions,
108
and kids begin to take stock of themselves.’” By the time the
ordinance was a year old, “approximately a dozen parents had been
charged” under it, Oregon state had passed a similar law, and
Silverton city officials had received requests from “Europe, Japan,
109
and Australia for copies of their ordinance.”
Using the Silverton ordinance as a template, a suburb in
110
Cleveland, Ohio, passed a nearly identical ordinance. Prosecutors
there could “criminally charge parents based on the misdeeds of their
children” with “a third offense” potentially resulting in parents
111
serving 180 days in jail. Recently, though, the ordinance was struck
down on the grounds that it “was inconsistent with a state statute
requiring the person charged to commit an act or omission as a
112
predicate for culpability.”
Another community, St. Clair Shores, Michigan, enacted a
113
similar law in 1994. According to the St. Clair Shores provision,
parents can be held criminally responsible for failing to “‘reasonably
114
control’” their children. The ordinance was drafted by two police

105. Parental Responsibility Laws, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, http://www.
ojjdp.gov/pubs/reform/ch2_d.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) (quoting SILVERTON, OR.,
ORDINANCE 95117 (1995)) (quotation marks omitted).
106. Tyler & Segady, supra note 11, at 86.
107. Id.
108. Collins et al., supra note 15, at 1340 (quotation marks omitted).
109. Tyler & Segady, supra note 11, at 87.
110. DAN MARKEL, JENNIFER M. COLLINS & ETHAN J. LEIB, PRIVILEGE OR PUNISH:
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF FAMILY TIES 67 (2009).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Tami Scarola, Creating Problems Rather Than Solving Them: Why Criminal Parental
Responsibility Laws Do Not Fit Within Our Understanding of Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
1029, 1042 (1997).
114. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
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officers who were “motivated by juvenile crime increases,” and it
115
passed “without debate.”
The proliferation of parental liability statutes is likely to
continue. Numerous municipalities across America have already
implemented parental liability ordinances, and many of those
ordinances are “hybrid laws that both lower the mens rea required for
the parent and define conduct by a minor that would not be
separately subject to criminal sanction as evidence of ‘improper
116
parenting.’”
These laws are not based on culpable parental
transgressions, like active participation or encouragement of the
unlawful behavior. Rather, they set “liability for parents based solely
117
on their status as a parent and the misconduct of their child alone.”
Cities nationwide often consider proposals to extend such liability,
and local legislatures will almost certainly “continue to explore
regulatory strategies” like this to “reduce juvenile misconduct” and
118
address social problems like bullying.
2. Crime-Free Ordinances. In addition to attracting a fine under
a parental liability ordinance, a criminal or unlawful act committed by
a child or any other household member could also potentially result
in the child’s entire family’s eviction from rental housing under a
mandated crime-free lease addendum. If her household lives in a
municipality that has passed a crime-free ordinance mandating that
landlord–tenant leases must contain a crime-free lease addendum,
and the lease accordingly contains such an addendum, the household
may be evicted for her unlawful act. The standard crime-free lease
addendum requires the eviction of an entire tenant family when a
tenant, family or household member, guest, or other person deemed
to be under the tenant’s control, engages in criminal conduct on—and
119
sometimes even off—the relevant premises. The following is an

115. Id.
116. Collins, supra note 15, at 1341.
117. Id. at 1342–43. The parents will then be able to “plead their good parenting skills as an
affirmative defense rather than making the prosecution prove the absence of good parenting as
part of its case-in-chief.” Id. at 1343. Indeed, it is unclear whether parents are actually being
punished for the wrongful act of their children, or for their unwillingness to accept law
enforcement interventions. See infra text accompanying notes 239–46.
118. Id. at 1342.
119. See, for example, West Palm Beach, Florida’s addendum. One Strike Policy, W. PALM
BEACH HOUSING AUTH., http://www.wpbha.org/housing/one_strike_policy.html (last visited
Jan. 16, 2015).
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example of an expansive, yet relatively common, crime-free lease
addendum:
Resident, any member(s) of the resident’s household, a guest or any
other person affiliated with the resident on or off the premises:
Shall not engage in criminal activity, including drug-related criminal
120
activity, on or off the said premises.

This type of addendum is part of the International Crime Free
121
Association’s (ICFA’s) programs for rental or multi-unit housing.
The ICFA, a not-for-profit started in Arizona in 1992 by a former
police officer, markets these programs to municipalities and provides
122
support to those that implement them. Illinois, in particular, has
championed this program, with over one hundred municipalities in
123
the state having adopted these ordinances. To fight crime and
disorder and promote the goal of security, approximately two
thousand cities and towns in forty-four states have implemented the
124
ICFA program. Proponents assert that the Crime-Free Program
offers myriad benefits, including “reduced crime, better community
awareness, increased property values, more attractive neighborhoods
125
. . . and improved quality of life.”

120. CLARK COUNTY ORDINANCE § 6.12.090 and CITY OF LAS VEGAS CODE § 6.09.020
require all landlords of multihousing units to undergo training, and at the training session
landlords are taught to use this addendum. Crime Free Multi-Housing, LAS VEGAS METRO.
POLICE DEP’T, http://www.lvmpd.com/ProtectYourself/CrimeFreeMultiHousing/tabid/110/
default.aspx (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
121. Art Sharp, CPTED: Cleaning up the Complexes, 49 LAW & ORD. 117, 119 (2001). It is
also widely used in Canada: cities in three Canadian provinces have implemented the program.
For example, in Edmonton, Alberta, it governs over sixteen thousand families. Crime Free
Testimonials: Keep Illegal Activity Off Rental Property, supra note 101.
122. Crime Free Programs, INT’L CRIME FREE ASS’N, http://www.crime-free-association
.org/index.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
123. EMILY WERTH & SARGENT SHRIVER, NAT’L CTR. ON POVERTY LAW, THE COST OF
BEING “CRIME FREE”: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIME FREE RENTAL
HOUSING AND NUISANCE PROPERTY ORDINANCES 1 (2013).
124. Crime Free Testimonials: Keep Illegal Activity Off Rental Property, supra note 101. A
smattering of these cities have provided positive testimonials on the Crime Free Program’s
website, including Riverside, California; Kansas City, Missouri; Champlin, Minnesota; Monroe,
Georgia; Columbia, Missouri; San Dimas, California; Lenexa, Kansas; St. Cloud, Minnesota;
Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Henrico County, Virginia; El Cajon, California; Puyallup, Washington;
Waite Park, Minnesota; and Fargo, North Dakota. Locales in other countries, including Canada,
Mexico, England, and Finland, have also adopted the ordinances. See Crime Free Programs,
supra note 122.
125. Crime Free Multi-Housing Program, CITY OF DUBLIN, CAL., http://www.ci.dublin.ca.us/
index.aspx?NID=118 (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
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The Crime-Free Program involves several prongs, including
training for property owners and managers, and attention to the
126
physical aspects of security, like lighting and locks. The crime-free
127
lease addendum, however, is the “cornerstone” of the program. The
model addendum was originally created by the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, in the form of the one-strike
128
policy applicable only to federal housing projects.
The new
municipal ordinances import this policy from the public housing
context—where it was part of the artillery in the war against drugs—
129
into the private rental housing market at large.
The typical crime-free lease addendum has five notable features.
First, in the private rental housing market, the addendum draws
multiple third parties into the project of policing. The named tenant
or the head of the household and the landlord are both conscripted
into the project of crime control. The tenant is required to monitor
and deter potentially unlawful behavior, and the landlord is required
to evict tenants who fail to do so. Police or other city officials
communicate their desire for eviction to the landlord, who must
usually comply or face a series of escalating sanctions, including fines
130
or the loss of a business license.
Second, the crime-free lease addendum holds tenants responsible
for actions that they may be connected to only tangentially, by virtue
of their familial or social relationship with another person. The
addendum is based in strict vicarious liability, so although “the tenant
herself may have had absolutely nothing to do with the alleged
criminal conduct or drug activity, she is nevertheless subject to
126. Crime Free Testimonials: Keep Illegal Activity Off Rental Property, supra note 101.
127. Id.
128. Sharp, supra note 121, at 119. For a discussion of the one-strike policy in the context of
Section 8 housing, see Michael Zmora, Note, Between Rucker and a Hard Place: The Due
Process Void for Section 8 Voucher Holders in No-Fault Evictions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1961
(2009); Wendy J. Kaplan & David Rossman, Called ‘Out’ At Home: The One-Strike Eviction
Policy and Juvenile Court, 109 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 109 (2011).
129. While crime-free lease addendums have not yet attracted much attention from legal
scholars, there is a large body of literature focused on the one-strike policy. Because it formed
the precedent for the crime-free lease addendum, and many of the issues surrounding them are
similar, this Article uses the one-strike literature where appropriate. See Levy, supra note 12, at
540.
130. Crime Free Testimonials: Keep Illegal Activity Off Rental Property, supra note 101.
Typically, following some kind of arrest or police involvement, the city will send the landlord a
letter, indicating that they must evict their tenants or face a series of sanctions, including fines
and the revocation of the rental license. See, e.g., Javinsky-Wenzek v. City of St. Louis Park, 829
F. Supp. 2d 787, 790 (D. Minn. 2011).
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eviction for the conduct of the person who actually engaged in the
131
prohibited activity.” Indeed, some ordinances “actually specify their
intent to penalize the entire household for criminal activity regardless
of whether members were aware of the activity or able to control the
132
participants in the activity.” It is thought that such an addendum
will offer “maximum incentives to tenants to prevent, discover, and
133
remedy” the drug or criminal issues of household members.
Third, a crime-free lease addendum often encompasses a wide
spectrum of behaviors, including not just criminal wrongs, but any
sort of unlawful act, such as “local ordinance violations, the creation
of a nuisance, and/or any conduct that endangers health, safety or
134
welfare.”
Fourth, although some versions of these addendums limit the
geographical scope to encompass only activities engaged in at the
relevant premises, other versions, like the one set out in full above,
135
extend to locations beyond the relevant rental property.
Fifth, and finally, these addendums do not generally require a
criminal conviction of any kind. Instead, arrests and simple
136
accusations of criminal or drug-related activity can trigger eviction.
This is particularly important when one remembers that ordermaintenance policing, which is currently the dominant mode of
policing in America, targets misdemeanor and minor or noncriminal
offenses. The vast majority of arrests currently made are not for
serious crimes, but rather for minor infractions, and under the crimefree program, these arrests are a valid basis for evicting a
137
household.
Some ordinances specifically state that arrests or
131. Robert Hornstein, Litigating Around the Long Shadow of Department of Housing and
Urban Development v. Rucker: The Availability of Abuse of Discretion and Implied Duty of
Good Faith Affirmative Defenses in Public Housing Criminal Activity Evictions, 43 U. TOL. L.
REV. 1, 4 (2011).
132. WERTH, supra note 123, at 12.
133. Reply Brief for the Petitioner, Brief for Respondent at 24, Dep’t of Hous. & Urban
Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (Nos. 00-1770, 00-1781), available at http://www.justice.gov/
osg/brief/hud-v-rucker-reply-merits.
134. WERTH, supra note 123, at 4.
135. Crime Free Testimonials: Keep Illegal Activity Off Rental Property, supra note 101.
136. Hornstein, supra note 131, at 275.
137. For example, in New York City in 1989, prior to the adoption of zero-tolerance
policing, “there were approximately 86,000 non-felony arrests.” K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives
from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 281, 291 (2009). In 1998, “when the policy was well-entrenched,”
176,000 nonfelony arrests were made. Id. Further, arrests are a zone fraught with discretion,
which unfortunately is often exercised in racially discriminatory ways. “[B]lack youths are
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accusations of unlawful activity are sufficient grounds for eviction,
whereas other ordinances have the slightly higher requirement that,
at an eviction proceeding, criminal activity must be proven to the civil
138
standard of a preponderance of the evidence. Eviction proceedings,
however, do not often go all the way to a courtroom because most
139
tenants do not fight their eviction notices.
3. Nuisance Ordinances. Nuisance ordinances are often used in
140
conjunction with crime-free lease addendums. They first became
141
popular in the 1980s, mainly as a response to drug dealing.
Currently, many large U.S. cities rely on nuisance ordinances as part
142
of their crime-control efforts. Under these ordinances, tenants will
be evicted if the police are called to the property more than a
threshold number of times, regardless of whether or not the tenant
had any participation in the nuisance activity that prompted the calls.
Those who pass nuisance ordinances believe that they have many
“important long-term benefits,” including providing safer and more
arrested at a disproportionately higher rate than whites,” and the discriminatory treatment at
the arrest stage is merely the first stop on a two-path system, exacerbated by eviction policies.
“When the children of affluent people are caught using drugs, they’re apt to end up in treatment
programs; the children of poor people are more likely to end up in jail, while their parents may
end up on the streets.” Renai S. Rodney, Am I My Mother’s Keeper? The Case Against the Use
of Juvenile Arrest Records in One-Strike Public Housing Evictions, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 739, 763
(2004). As one example of race and arrest numbers, in New York City in 2000–2005, “about
86% of people arrested for misdemeanors . . . were nonwhite.” Howell, supra note 137, at 281,
291.
138. WERTH, supra note 123, at 4.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 120. In 1987, Portland, Oregon, was among the
first cities to pass a nuisance-abatement ordinance to address drug dealing. MARTHA J. SMITH &
LORRAINE MAZEROLLE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USING CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST PROPERTY
TO CONTROL CRIME PROBLEMS 14 (2013). Many states followed suit, and
by 1992, 24 U.S. states had passed statutes specifically designed to control drug
activities on private properties. A number of these were based on old ‘bawdy house’
laws designed to curb prostitution. Abatement and eviction notices have been used
hand-in-hand to address drug crimes in housing. Abatement actions focus on the
property holder while eviction actions focus on the leaseholder or renter, but
sometimes it is necessary to provide notice of potential abatement actions to induce
the owner to act against the tenant.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Of course, nuisance as a civil cause of action has a much longer history.
142. For example, in 2007, to combat gang activity, Los Angeles County “began using
nuisance abatement lawsuits against both the property owners and the specific gang members
who allowed or created a nuisance at a particular property,” and Seattle, Washington, passed a
“chronic nuisance property ordinance” in 2009. Id. In Los Angeles County, a chronic-nuisance
property is “one where certain crimes, drug-related activities, or gang-related activities occur
three times within a 60-day period or seven times within a 12-month period.” Id. at 16.
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appealing communities, increasing property values, and having a
143
general “good effect on quality of life.”
A survey combining the nuisance ordinances of the twenty
largest U.S. cities with an additional thirty-nine ordinances in cities
that varied in location and population revealed that most nuisance
144
145
ordinances are “strikingly similar.” They have three main features.
First, the nuisance designation is “based on excessive service calls [i.e.
146
calls to police] made within a certain timeframe.” Second, a large
147
and loosely defined set of activities can constitute a nuisance. For
instance, one city defines nuisance conduct as
any activity, conduct, or condition occurring upon private property
within the city that unreasonably annoys, injures or endangers the
safety, health, morals, comfort or repose of any member of the
public; or will, or tend to, alarm, anger or disturb others or provoke
148
breach of the peace, to which the city is required to respond.

Finally, like the crime-free lease addendums, nuisance
ordinances demand that landlords perform third-party policing
functions and “coerce property owners to ‘abate the nuisance’ or face
149
fines, property forfeiture, or even incarceration.”
As with the crime-free lease addendum, nuisance ordinances
coerce both landlords and tenants into performing third-party
policing. In many cases, the tenant is not the person who actually
causes the nuisance, yet the tenant is the person who will face the
legal consequence of the nuisance behavior. One troubling
manifestation of this aspect of nuisance ordinances occurs in the
context of domestic violence. Female tenants, who have either
themselves contacted police or whose neighbors, family members, or
friends did so, have been evicted for violating nuisance ordinances in

143. Municipal Nuisances: South Dakota Municipal League Guide to Public Nuisance
Enforcement and Abatement, S.D. MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, available at http://sd.govoffice.com/
vertical/sites/%7B2540dc39-a742-459f-8caf-7839ecf21e89%7D/uploads/%7B46e3eb3f-0a314411-ade5-83640bfec0d4%7D.pdf.
144. Matthew Desmond & Nicol Valdez, Online Supplement to Unpolicing the Urban Poor:
Consequences of Third-Party Policing for Inner-City Women 2 (2013), http://scholar.
harvard.edu/files/mdesmond/files/unpolicing.asr2013.online.supplement_0.pdf.
145. Id.
146. Id. Often, three or four calls a year related to drug activity will be enough to trigger the
provisions. Id.
147. Id.
148. ROBBINSDALE, MINN., CODE § 927.03 (2013).
149. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 120.
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connection with their attempts to seek assistance during home
150
violence.
II. RISK MANAGEMENT AND CRIME PREVENTION AT HOME
This Part explains how home rule ordinances configure the home
as a site of risk management, crime prevention, and security
production. Although homes are usually understood as private
spaces, in reality, as Part II.A describes, the state makes numerous
interventions into the home, and home rule ordinances are one more
such incursion. Home rule ordinances configure the home as a site of
security production: a place where criminality must be prevented and
the goals of security advanced. Part II.B sets out the means that home
rule ordinances use to accomplish these goals. Home rule ordinances
compel a set of behaviors that the state believes are “necessary and
151
desirable for the management of social order and stability.” These
behaviors include acts of surveillance, monitoring, and isolation. This
Part discusses how engaging in these compelled behaviors strains
social and familial relations, impacts zones of intimacy and trust, and
entails a psychic cost upon the person forced to embody the state in
this way. Although the sanctions that accompany the home rule
ordinances are themselves deeply problematic, the compelled acts
that are required to successfully perform third-party policing in the
152
home are perhaps even more worthy of concern.
A. The Dominant Legal and Cultural Constructions of Home
Homes are generally thought of as private spaces, where one can
interact with the members of one’s family and intimate circle as one
pleases, and where, absent domestic abuse or other harms to
153
household members, state intervention is usually unwarranted. As
Professor Jeannie Suk explains:
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Mele, supra note 11, at 135.
Id.
SUK, supra note 82, at 1; Martha Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1207, 1207 (1999). It should be noted, as Professor Martha Fineman does, that
[s]omewhat of a dilemma is presented for those of us who view ‘privacy’ as essential
to the concept of family while simultaneously conceding the more modern notion that
privacy can conceal, even foster, situations dangerous to the individuals who comprise
the family unit. The focus on the necessity of privacy for family formation and
functioning arises from concern with abuses associated with state intervention and
regulation of intimacy. By contrast, those who are attuned to potential abuses within
the family remind us that hidden beneath the cloak of privacy are power imbalances,
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Few concepts are as ubiquitous in ordinary human experience as the
home. For most people, the home has formative cultural, emotional,
and psychic significance. “Home,” as distinct from household or the
physical structure of the house, emerged in the nineteenth century
as a bourgeois ideal of domesticity and privacy, closely associated
with the affective private life of the family. This still evolving
concept deeply informs our sense of who we are, and our feelings of
154
safety and belonging.

The home also represents “the metaphorical boundary between
private and public spheres,” and serves as a nodal site where “the
most basic questions about the relation between individuals and state
155
power arise.” The idea of the privacy or “sanctity” of the home is
recognized and protected in much constitutional jurisprudence,
156
particularly in Fourth Amendment cases. In that context, the
Supreme Court has specified that homes are to be protected from
excessive government oversight and that the State is not to be
157
“omnipresent in the home.” In this construction, respect for the
home as a special space has been “embedded in our traditions since
the origins of the Republic,” and absent compelling reasons, state
158
intervention should be minimal.
Yet, despite this rhetoric, the home is subject to government and
159
institutional interventions on many fronts.
Most of these
interventions are justified on the basis that they prevent or redress
perhaps even incentives for the strong to prey upon or exploit the weak. When we
consult the empirical information, it seems both perspectives are warranted.
Id.
154. Id. at 1–2.
155. Id. at 3.
156. Id.
157. Heidi Reamer Anderson, Plotting Privacy as Intimacy, 46 IND. L. REV. 311, 326 (2013)
(quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003)). The privacy of the home has also been
critiqued as serving as a “mask for male oppression within families” and a cloak for “the
violence against women and children” that occurs in that setting. “But the private sphere
ideology, with all its faults, nonetheless also established as a concept the desirability of a space
into which the state, absent compelling reasons, was not free to intrude.” Martha Albertson
Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The Limits of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 955,
968 (1991). Privacy torts, too, support the home as a setting of “spatial intimacy,” deserving of
significant legal protections. Anderson, supra, at 318.
158. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980). The laws governing the harboring of
fugitives also suggest the special status of homes and families. Fourteen states exempt family
members from prosecution for this wrongful act. An additional four states offer reduced liability
to family members for this offense. Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins & Ethan J. Leib, Criminal
Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1147, 1160 (2007).
159. Fineman, supra note 153, at 1207.
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harms to others, both inside and outside of the home. For instance,
the state now intervenes to protect family members and intimate
partners from abuse and mistreatment. Additionally, institutions like
school and work have increasing authority over occurrences in the
home that may harm others outside of it. To use an example from the
bullying context, what a child does at home can now attract
160
disciplinary action from the school. As long as a home-based
activity has some impact on school life, it can subject students to
161
school discipline. Similarly, home-based activities that affect the
workplace can fall under the umbrella of activities that may subject
162
an employee to workplace discipline.
Of course, some homes have always been subject to more state
163
intervention than others. The privilege of privacy has often had less
political potency when applied to housing that has a “public”
dimension, like federal housing projects or Section 8 subsidized
164
housing. The one-strike policy in federal housing is a good example
of homes being understood as open to public scrutiny and control.
Initially, the burden of deterring the criminality of others was placed
only on those with homes in federal housing projects, which are thus
somehow “public.” “For those deemed eligible to live in public
housing,” the ability to remain in residence there depended “upon
[their] adherence to stricter rules and regulations” than those applied
165
to more “private” homes.
Now, crime-free lease ordinances have brought the one-strike
policy into the private housing realm, and they, along with parental
liability and nuisance ordinances, ensure that more households than
ever are responsible for producing security through deterring crime.
To deter others, parents and heads of household are expected to
perform behaviors involving surveillance, monitoring, and exclusion
in cooperation with state recommendations and programs. In these

160. Deborah Ahrens, Schools, Cyberbullies, and the Surveillance State, 49 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1669, 1698 n.142, 1702 n.163 (2012).
161. Id.
162. For a discussion of this issue, see Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L.
REV. 655, 672 n.83 (2012).
163. To be sure, state intervention into the home has not meant the same thing historically
across race and class.
164. Austin, supra note 11, at 273–75.
165. Mele, supra note 11, at 136. Those rules were “legitimated by larger political discourses
on welfarism, the worthy poor, and drugs and crime.” Id.
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ways, the state is able to intervene inside the home in a rather
insidious way: through one’s friends and family members.
B. Compelled Compliance Behaviors
To avoid legal sanction, home rule ordinances require parents
and heads of household to perform a set of conforming behaviors.
These individuals must don the role of “guarantor” or “insurer” of
other people’s actions and assume an “affirmative obligation” to
“monitor and control their own and others’ choices of associations
166
and relationships.” Tenants must “scrutinize the behaviors of family
members, their friends, and visitors within the home and outside of
it,” and ward off the possibility that one of them will engage in
167
unlawful conduct. Surveillance, monitoring, and isolation are the
techniques meant to be employed in this pursuit.
1. Surveillance and Monitoring. Surveillance and monitoring are
a part of modern life. Gradually, increased surveillance, at least in the
public sphere, has become normalized: “[E]ach new surveillance or
discipline technique normalizes a certain amount of state intrusion
and paves the way for the next program that goes a step
further. . . . Step-by-step, panic-by-panic, we have weakened the
168
boundaries that have protected a private sphere.” Despite this kind
of “surveillance creep,” the home, as a traditionally private sphere,
has been relatively buffered from the monitoring going on in the
outside world. Home rule ordinances, however, require the
performance of surveillance and monitoring activities. Through these
ordinances, cities have “slipped control, surveillance, and regulation
169
into ordinary everyday behaviors.”
One example of “surveillance creep” within the home comes in
the context of cyberbullying. To prevent children from being involved
with cyberbullying, parents are advised to engage in a series of
monitoring activities including using a cellular-phone service plan that
grants parents significant control over the child’s phone activities,
adjusting parental control settings on the Internet, and limiting

166. Id. at 135 (quotation marks omitted).
167. Id. at 122.
168. Ahrens, supra note 160, at 1704. Ahrens’s reference is to “a private sphere for public
school students.” Id.
169. Mele, supra note 11, at 122.

SWAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1/26/2015 11:38 PM

854

[Vol. 64:823

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
170

computer use. These kinds of activities, performed at the behest of
the state rather than because the parent believes it to be the best
course of action for their particular child, encourage “parents to
abandon their traditional role of protecting their children and join in
171
partnership with the state in becoming risk managers.” The overall
message to parents is that “the repression of criminal conduct must
take priority over any other objectives of child rearing and that
parents will be expected to accomplish this largely on their own or
172
with what they can purchase.”
Performing surveillance activities often comes at a significant
cost, not only in terms of personal resources, but also in terms of
stress on relationships. It “is not conducive to familial relations to
have loved ones forced to play vigilante with one another, constantly
173
in a state of suspicion.” At the same time as parents are advised that
they should implement the monitoring techniques listed above, they
are also warned that they must nevertheless “be mindful that
communication is a key aspect of social development and that
constant surveillance of their child’s Internet use may damage parent174
child trust.”
The kinds of negative impacts that accompany
monitoring and surveillance help explain, for example, why a parent
may wish to have a school perform drug searches on her children
rather than performing them herself:
[B]y having schools search their children, parents are permitted to
maintain a better relationship with their children than they might
have otherwise and are spared the effort of personally conducting
the search. Parents do not have to confront their children or risk
damage to parent/child trust by requesting their children subject
themselves to potentially invasive or humiliating searches. If drug
testing is the price for participating in school activities and allowing
your principal access to your photos is the price for bringing a cell

170. Kevin Turbert, Note, Faceless Bullies: Legislative and Judicial Responses to
Cyberbullying, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 651, 689 (2009).
171. Tammy Thurman, Parental Responsibility Laws/Are They the Answer to Juvenile
Delinquency?, 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 99, 106 (2003).
172. SIMON, supra note 49, at 202.
173. Timothy E. Heinle, Comment, Guilty by Association: What the Decision in Boston
Housing Authority v. Garcia Means for the Innocent Family Members of Criminals Living in
Public Housing in Massachusetts, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 213, 232
(2009).
174. Turbert, supra note 170, at 689–90.
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phone to school, then parents plausibly can shift the blame onto
175
schools for policing techniques that are sure to enrage teenagers.

Regardless of whether searches also occur in places outside the
home, some courts have agreed with the state’s view that parents or
tenants should conduct home searches for drugs or other
176
contraband. For instance, in the Supreme Court decision that
upheld the one-strike policy, Department of Housing & Urban
177
Development v. Rucker, it was noted in her favor that Pearlie
Rucker, a sixty-three year old grandmother subject to eviction from a
public housing project after her daughter was caught with cocaine a
few blocks from the premises, had regularly searched her daughter’s
178
room. These efforts may have factored into the housing authority’s
179
ultimate decision not to pursue Ms. Rucker’s eviction.
At least one court, though, has concluded that asking tenants to
search their guests and family members is not an acceptable
180
requirement. In addressing a case in which a tenant was evicted
based on a guest’s possession of a small amount of drugs, the Ohio
Municipal Court held that eviction under these circumstances was
tantamount to holding that tenants could simply have no guests, or
“equally implausibl[y]” that tenants “must conduct a thorough search
181
of each guest” every time he or she visited. Although this judge
believed that tenants should not have to search their guests or socially
isolate themselves to avoid eviction, other courts have held that
guests in possession of small amounts of drugs are a valid basis for
182
eviction. Thus, heads of household concerned about facing eviction
may indeed feel the need to bar guests or search the guests that they
do invite to their homes.
2. Isolation. Home rule ordinances have isolating effects on
kinship and relationship formation. An example from a sociologist’s

175. Ahrens, supra note 160, at 1714–15 (footnotes omitted).
176. See, e.g., Dayton Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Kilgore, 958 N.E.2d 187, 192 (Ohio Ct. App.
2011) (holding a tenant strictly liable for the drug offenses of her guests under Rucker).
177. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
178. Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’d, Dep’t of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
179. Id.
180. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Harris, 861 N.E.2d 179, 181 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 2006).
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Dayton Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Kilgore, 958 N.E.2d 187, 192 (Ohio Ct. App.
2011).
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study of the mobilization of resident organizations in federal public
housing dramatically demonstrates these isolating effects. Describing
a public housing project in southeastern North Carolina, the
sociologist recounts how just outside the projects, “a small number of
African-American men would routinely assemble each morning at a
street corner to wait for their girlfriends or wives, who were residents
of a nearby housing project, to leave their apartments and cross the
183
street to visit them.” It turned out that the men “who had been
accused, arrested, or convicted of various criminal infractions, were
184
barred from stepping foot on the project.” For their female
companions, “the cost of permitting them to visit or stay the night was
185
possible eviction” under the one-strike policy.
For these couples, the one-strike policy altered the terms of their
186
relationships. The female tenant was allowed to keep her home only
187
if she agreed to banish her partner from the premises. For some
tenants, then, social and familial isolation is the price of maintaining
their homes. The difficulty of sustaining a relationship under these
188
conditions is obvious.
Children are also often banned from the premises as a solution to
189
potential eviction in federal-housing situations. Indeed, when a
child’s behavior is the trigger for eviction, “the matter is most often
settled with an agreement that the child will no longer live in the

183. Christopher Mele & Teresa A. Miller, Introduction, in CIVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES, supra note 11, at 2.
184. Id.
185. Id. For another example of how law can directly impact intimate relationships, see King
v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 334 (1968).
186. This is similar to the situation Professor Jeannie Suk describes in relation to protective
orders and domestic law. Suk, supra note 81, at 14.
187. Domestic-violence law also encourages partner separation. See id. at 53.
188. This is particularly interesting in light of recent studies focused on the connections
between marriage, class, and race. See CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART: THE STATE OF
WHITE AMERICA, 1960–2010, at 11–13 (2013); RALPH RICHARD BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR
WHITE PEOPLE? 1–4 (2011). Moreover, “families headed by single mothers, and especially
black single mothers,” have “been blamed for a myriad of social problems, including
unemployment, poor health, school drop-out rates and an increase in juvenile crime.” Twila L.
Perry, Family Values, Race, Feminism and Public Policy, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 345, 345
(1996). Often ignored in these discussions is how such policies exert fracturing pressures on the
development of intimate relationships.
189. Austin notes that “[j]ust as in slave times when commercial transactions separated
mothers from their children, here too ‘kinship’ loses meaning since it is subject to termination in
the name of property relations.” Austin, supra note 11, at 286.
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190

unit.” “Agreement” may be a strong word in this context, given that
the situation reads like “a classic Catch 22. Either the family agrees to
dispossess one of its children, or stays together and finds itself out on
191
the street.”
Such banning procedures have obvious social
consequences like “divided families, the surveillance of intimacy,”
192
and “the stigma of past behavior.”
To avoid the risk that a loved one may engage in wrongful
behavior, tenants trying to avoid the operation of crime-free lease
addendums may similarly alter the terms of their relationships with
others. When eviction is based not on a tenant’s level of fault, but on
“the relationship established between the leaseholder and covered
person,” the tenant is left to decide whether the relationship is worth
193
risking her home. Indeed, in the context of public housing, officials
have explicitly stated that they want tenants to choose their housing
over their families. One city mayor bluntly asserted that, “‘[w]e want
tenants to understand that if they don’t control members of their
194
families, they are going to lose their housing.’” A housing authority
director offered a further clarification of this sentiment: “‘The head of
household is responsible for family members . . . . The message is,
don’t risk your house; let them [family members] fend for
195
themselves.’” The lines are clearly drawn: a tenant must choose
between allegiance to the state, which will require alienating a loved
196
one, or allegiance to her family, which may require her eviction.
190. Kaplan & Rossman, supra note 128, at 109, 119–20. And “forty-four percent of all One
Strike cases that are not cancelled or dismissed end in an agreement that the offending member
of the household, often a child or grandchild, will be banished from the family home.” Id. at 120
n.70. The experience of Gloria Franklin and her son serves as one example. Seventeen-year-old
Tyran Pratt was arrested “allegedly with $10 worth of marijuana” outside of his mother’s home.
Although the charge against him was dismissed, the housing authority required his mother to
ban him from the premises or otherwise face eviction. As a newspaper article describes,
Franklin got choked up recalling the moment she told her son. It was one of the most
difficult points in her life, she said. “I gave him a hug, shared a few tears, and I just
told him, ‘You have to go; I’m sorry,’” Franklin added. Since Pratt left last summer,
Franklin says she hasn’t seen him much. He dropped out of school and has been living
on the streets. Sometimes he’ll call when he’s hungry, and she’ll bring him food. And
other times she sees him sleeping in a playground near her house, a sight she
describes as “one of the most hurtful things.”
Dylan Cinti, Dismantling Families, CHI. REP., Sept. 1, 2011, at 17.
191. Kaplan & Rossman, supra note 128, at 120.
192. Mele, supra note 11, at 2.
193. Id. at 128.
194. Weil, supra note 11, at 171 (quotation marks omitted).
195. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
196. For more on this kind of conflict between obligations to the family and obligations to
the state, see MARKEL ET AL., supra note 110, at 6–8.

SWAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1/26/2015 11:38 PM

858

[Vol. 64:823

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

For tenants who do not feel that they have the ability to closely
monitor or deter family members from wrongdoing, banishing these
individuals and isolating their households may be the only viable
option. These tenants may feel “overbearing pressure” to “close their
households” as a means of safeguarding their homes against potential
197
eviction. This is particularly true because of the no-fault basis for
evictions: even if the tenant makes a best-efforts attempt to deter
family members, if those attempts are unsuccessful, eviction will
follow. So, “[f]or instance, where a parent or grand-parent has no
realistic means of controlling the conduct of their adolescent children
or grandchildren at all times and at all places, the only way for the
tenant to minimize the risk of eviction . . . is to exclude their children
198
or grandchildren from the apartment altogether.” Such exclusion
comes at a profound social and psychic cost. Through home rule
ordinances, the state decides for whom families can care, and how
they can care for them.
Another important type of isolation that home rule ordinances
create occurs in the context of nuisance citations based in domestic
violence. Nuisance ordinances discourage tenants experiencing
domestic violence from calling the police because such calls lead to
199
nuisance citations, and nuisance citations lead to eviction. Many
not-for-profit groups providing assistance to women suffering
domestic abuse note that clients regularly state that they are not
calling police for assistance, even when they desperately need it,
200
because they fear eviction.
In other words, these nuisance
197. Brief for Respondents, supra note 133, at 92, Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker,
535 U.S. 125 (2002) (No. 00-1770).
198. Id. These ordinances may also dissuade tenants from letting recently paroled family
members or intimate partners live with them. They may fear that the paroled person “will get
back in trouble,” and cost them their housing. This is an additional negative impact on an
already difficult reintegration process. See Christine S. Scott-Hayward, The Failure of Parole:
Rethinking the Role of the State in Reentry, 41 N.M. L. REV. 421, 426 (2011).
199. Erik Eckholm, Victims’ Dilemma: 911 Calls Can Bring Eviction, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16,
2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/17/us/victims-dilemma-911-calls-canbring-eviction.html.
200. According to one grassroots domestic-violence group in a small metropolitan area, two
families accessed their emergency shelter in one month “to avoid calling police for fear of
evictions.” Statement of Interest: Alle-Kiski Area HOPE Center, Inc., Briggs v. Borough of
Norristown (E.D. Pa. May 31, 2013) (No. 2:13-cv-2191), available at https://www.aclu
.org/files/assets/2013_05_31_appendix_a_-_amici_statements_of_interest.pdf. Further, there is a
history of police ignoring women’s requests for assistance with domestic violence. In the 1970s
and 1980s, police ignored “the pleas of women seeking assistance simply because their assailants
were their husbands.” LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 106 (2012). In Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D.
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ordinances encourage battered women to isolate themselves from
201
society and from “the ‘protective arm’ of the state.” This was
illustrated in a case that the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
initiated on behalf of Lakisha Briggs, after the fear of eviction
prevented her from calling police during a nearly lethal attack by her
202
former boyfriend. The attack required her to be airlifted to a
hospital for emergency treatment, and she survived only because a
203
neighbor called the police. She did indeed face eviction proceedings
204
upon her return from hospital.
III. THE ROLE OF STRICT VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Even if one does engage in the acts of surveillance, monitoring,
and isolation that the home rule ordinances require, those efforts may
not be successful. This Part sets out how the strict vicarious liability
standard of the home rule ordinances allows for the imposition of
legal sanction, regardless of fault. Part III.A describes how the home
rule ordinances are “no-fault” laws, meaning that, as a policy matter,
they apply in the absence of what we normally consider to be morally
culpable behavior. The unlawful act of a household member, friend,
or guest, plus a relationship between that person and the parents or
tenants, is enough to trigger the sanction associated with the

Conn. 1984), a plaintiff was awarded $2.3 million after police stood by while her husband
“dropped the knife that dripped with his wife’s blood,” kicked her “repeatedly in the head,” and
tried to attack her again “while she was lying on a stretcher, waiting for medical treatment.”
GOODMARK, supra, at 106.
201. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 138.
202. Lakisha Briggs rented under the Section 8 voucher program. Ninety percent of Section
8 households are female-headed, and 30 percent of those women are disabled; 84 percent of
Section 8 households have children, with children making up 55 percent of all people assisted by
Section 8. Phil Steinhaus, Those Aided by Section 8 Not Criminals, COLUM. TRIB. (Jan. 4, 2009),
http://archive.columbiatribune.com/2009/Jan/20090104Comm008.asp.
203. One of the grounds of the lawsuit is that it violates the right to petition. Calling 911 is a
citizen’s “primary source of communication with the police.” Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42;
see also Tamara L. Kuennen, Recognizing the Right to Petition for Victims of Domestic Violence,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 837 (2012) (arguing that the police practice of calling Child
Protective Services when a mother experiences domestic violence violates her First Amendment
right “to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”).
204. Eckholm, supra note 199. Similarly, a landlord initiated eviction proceedings against
Veronica Maffeo in Boston, Massachusetts, on the basis that “she caused a disturbance when
she screamed for help” during a domestic assault perpetrated by her ex-boyfriend. Brief of
Amici Curiae of the National Network to End Domestic Violence at 3, Dep’t of Hous. & Urban
Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (No. 00-1770), 2001 WL 1663790 (citing Def’s Mot. To
Vacate J., New Trial, Weston Assoc. v. Veronica Maffeo at ¶ 4 (Hous. Ct. Dep’t, Boston Div.,
filed Sept. 2001) (Docket No. 01-SP-03935)).
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ordinance. This reality sits uncomfortably with our usual commitment
to punishment on the basis of individual culpability. Perhaps because
of this discomfort, extralegal narratives of fault have sprung up
around these ordinances. Those who advocate for and enforce these
provisions have constructed narratives of fault to rationalize the
imposition of legal sanctions in these circumstances.
In many important ways, vicarious liability in this context ends
up conflating vulnerability with fault. Part III.B outlines how home
rule ordinances essentially penalize parents and tenants for lacking
the ability to control the behavior of others, even though it is
arguably very difficult for anyone to truly control the behavior of
another. Moreover, home rule ordinances tend to have the most
impact upon members of vulnerable groups, such as minorities, the
poor, and female-headed households, creating problematic
connections between vulnerability, fault, and the inability to control
others.
Further, as Part III.C discusses, the vicarious liability nature of
the home rule ordinances has an additional consequence: a profound
framing effect that assigns blame to both the wrongdoer and his or
her social and familial relations. Left outside of this frame are larger,
structural factors that are heavily correlated with crime and drug
abuse, such as poverty, economic inequality, and lack of opportunity.
A. Individual Culpability and Narratives of Fault
The idea of “individual culpability for wrongdoing” is a
205
foundational principle of the American legal system. As one judge
phrased it, “Our demand that responsibility be personal” is a
communal value, “the result of the ‘inarticulate, subconscious sense
206
of justice of the [person] on the street.’” Strict vicarious liability, in
which a person is liable for another’s actions even though he or she
has not personally engaged in any wrongdoing, seems to fly in the

205. James Massey, Susan L. Miller & Anna Wilhelmi, Civil Forfeiture of Property: The
Victimization of Women as Innocent Owners and Third Parties, in SUSAN L. MILLER, CRIME
CONTROL AND WOMEN: FEMINIST IMPLICATIONS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY 15, 15 (Susan
L. Miller ed., 1998).
206. City of Maple Heights v. Ephraim, 898 N.E.2d 974, 982 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008)
(alteration in original) (quoting Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of
Accomplice Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 103 (1985))
(technically speaking about criminal vicarious liability). Though, given the blurring of criminal
and civil lines here, the comments are applicable to these scenarios as well.
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207

face of that. It is an “exception to the usual rule that each person is
accountable for his own legal fault, but in the absence of such fault, is
208
not responsible for the actions of others.” Nevertheless, in a variety
of contexts, we do allow strict or vicarious liability to exist without
209
experiencing too much existential angst. Strict liability is a fairly
common feature of contract and tort law, and its manifestations in the
form of “vicarious, corporate, and joint and several liability” are not
210
regarded as particularly controversial. For example, the doctrine of
respondeat superior, which holds employers vicariously liable for the
acts of their employees, is a well-accepted application of strict
211
liability. Vicarious liability is currently understood mainly as a
policy device to transfer risk to the person who profits from it, is best
212
able to avoid it, and can best financially manage it.
Vicarious liability most often concerns business relationships,
like “employer-employee, corporation-manager, buyer-seller,
213
producer-consumer, and service provider-recipient.” But the idea of
strict vicarious liability is no stranger to the domestic or family
214
context. Rather, “the tendency to include secondary social others as
responsible for the crime, deviance, and the sins of family members,
friends and significant others is well-established in the human
215
experience,” and “[f]amilial responsibility has been a consistent

207. Technically, strict liability and vicarious liability are not the same concept, but much of
the literature on parental liability and the one-strike policy uses these terms interchangeably.
Strict liability is “a concept associated principally with the law of torts” and “is popularly
understood to mean liability without fault.” Hornstein, supra note 131, at 263. Vicarious
liability, on the other hand, exists when the conduct of a third party is imputed to the defendant.
Vicarious liability is “a form of strict liability.” Id. at 264.
208. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 333 (2000).
209. Levinson, supra note 69, at 361.
210. Id. at 421. Vicarious liability is deeply tied to the notion of agency. It can also apply
when one has entrusted another with her property. For example, in Van Oster v. Kansas, 272
U.S. 465 (1926), the Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture of a vehicle used to illegally transport
liquor by someone to whom the owner had entrusted the vehicle. SAMAHA, supra note 9, at 229.
211. Interestingly, the philosopher and jurist Jeremy Bentham linked this doctrine to the
concept of policing. He used the metaphor of policing to describe how respondeat superior
operated to ensure that that the master would act as an “inspector of police, a domestic
magistrate” for a servant’s torts. Kraakman, supra note 28, at 53 n.1. It should also be noted that
this kind of liability originated in the household. Levinson, supra note 69, at 354 n.34.
212. See PAULA GILIKER, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN TORT: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
90 (2010).
213. SAMAHA, supra note 9, at 208.
214. Indeed, state statutes and ordinances in which parents are held vicariously liable for
their children’s wrongful actions are now relatively common. Id. at 230.
215. Massey et al., supra note 205, at 15.
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216

theme in legal and social sanctioning regimes since ancient times.”
Historically, many cultures have viewed clans and families, not
individuals, as their primary “jural unit” or “relevant unit of moral
agency and blame,” and group responsibility has functioned as the
217
dominant legal norm.
Modern thought has, however, replaced the ancient notion that
218
the “sins of the father will be visited upon the children” with a focus
on individual rights and responsibilities. Now, the idea of “individual
culpability for wrongdoing, especially in the case of criminal
behavior . . . forms the very foundation for the administration of
219
justice in Western societies.” In general, we, as a society, have the
sense that although a person can sometimes be justly held responsible
for contributing to another person’s wrongdoing, we are deeply
troubled by concerns of “‘punishing the innocent,’ imposing ‘guilt by
220
association,’ or ‘failing to treat people as individuals.’”
Now, when strict liability is brought into the home, it affronts our
modern sense that only individuals who are themselves culpable
should be held legally liable. For instance, the crime-free lease
addendums would allow “eviction of an entire family if a tenant’s
child was visiting friends on the other side of the country and was
caught smoking marijuana, even if the parents had no idea the child
had ever engaged in such activity and even if they had no realistic way
221
to control their child’s actions 3,000 miles away.” The “principle of
house-hold wide responsibility” for such a wrong can strike the
modern conscience as profoundly unfair, as can the eviction of a
family making best efforts to care for its members and avoid

216. Levinson, supra note 69, at 411.
217. MARK S. WEINER, THE RULE OF THE CLAN: WHAT AN ANCIENT FORM OF SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION REVEALS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 1, 3 (2013);
Levinson, supra note 69, at 348.
218. This phrase, and its variations, appears in many Western canonical texts, including the
Bible, Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, and Euripides. See, e.g., EURIPIDES, FRAGMENTS
563, Frag. 980 (Christopher Collard & Martin Cropp eds. & trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2008).
219. Massey et al., supra note 205, at 15.
220. Levinson, supra note 69, at 348.
221. Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’d, Dep’t of Hous. & Urban
Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002). Most of the one-strike cases are about drug possession: one
study of the one-strike policy cases in Chicago found that over 70 percent of cases involved drug
possession, and less than 10 percent involved drug dealing. Angela Caputo, One and Done, CHI.
REP. (Sept. 1, 2011), http://chicagoreporter.com/one-and-done. In 2010, 76 percent of arrests
leading to eviction were for misdemeanors. Id.
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criminality, such as when a family member is on a waitlist for a drug222
treatment program.
Courts and other judicial actors have often indicated difficulties
with accepting as legitimate the strict-liability nature of home rule
ordinances. For instance, in one case, a jury held that eviction of a
mother and her children, ranging in age from sixteen to twenty-five,
223
was unwarranted, despite facts stipulating to the son’s drug use.
Also, a judge in the public housing context expressly noted that
although she felt bound by the decision in Rucker, she had great
difficulty trying to “reconcile fundamental principles of fairness and
due process with a finding that wholly innocent persons can be
punished for the criminal activity of others of which they had no
224
knowledge and over which they had no control.”
Many courts have expressed similar concerns when presented
with situations in which vicarious liability results in criminal
225
sanctions. Some courts have found that in minor misdemeanor
cases, when the punishment at issue is only a “slight fine and not
imprisonment,” vicarious criminal liability does not violate due
process, but other courts have held that this does violate due process,
and that the consequences of a criminal conviction “cannot rest on so
frail a reed” as whether someone else will “commit a mistake in
226
judgment.” Nevertheless, when vicarious liability is upheld, it is
often justified by the deterrent effect it is supposed to have on both
227
the wrongdoer and the person ultimately held responsible.
At its worst, vicarious liability seems to involve “the sacrifice of
innocent individuals on the altar of some allegedly worthy social
228
purpose.” It conflicts with the deeply held belief that unless a
person “has done something to deserve and warrant punishment, the
state lacks moral and political authority to move against him, at least
in a democratic state committed to liberal values of individual liberty
222. The phrase “principle of household-wide responsibility” was used in the Reply Brief
for the Department of Housing and Urban Development in the Rucker case. Weil, supra note
11, at 177.
223. The court issued a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Jamie’s Place I LLC v. Reyes,
No. L&T252658/08, 2009 WL 4282852 (Table), at *4 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Oct. 22, 2009).
224. Hous. Auth. of Joliet v. Chapman, 780 N.E.2d 1106, 1108 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (McDade,
J., concurring).
225. SAMAHA, supra note 9, at 229.
226. Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 155 A.2d 825, 830 (Pa. 1959) (citing Francis Bowes Sayre,
Criminal Responsibility for Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. REV. 689 (1930)).
227. Id.
228. Brief for Respondents, supra note 133, at 56.
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and autonomy.” In the context of home rule ordinances, where
someone faces significant legal sanctions as a result of their
relationship with another person somehow connected to their home,
and not based on their own wrongdoing, vicarious liability seems
particularly egregious.
Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that supporters of these
kinds of ordinances have constructed narratives of fault around them.
According to these narratives, those who are subject to home rule
ordinances are, in some extralegal sense, blameworthy. Although not
technically “at fault” in the legal sense, they are constructed as at
fault in some larger moral sense. It seems that the absence of a legal
fault element has created a void into which a nonlegal fault element
has grown—to justify the use of strict liability and its accordant legal
sanctions in this context.
1. Failing to Govern and Be Governed. One narrative of fault at
work in the context of home rule ordinances is that the tenant or
parent is at fault both in relation to her ability to govern and in
relation to her willingness to be governed. The state arguably “regards
the polity as a household, the occupants of which must be disciplined
and directed,” and must in turn discipline and direct their own
230
households. Government is, in some sense, a form of household
management, and household management is, conversely, an
231
important part of state governance.
The idea of a “family
government” that is a microcosm for the larger state is an old one:
Aristotle began his Politics with a discussion of household
governance, and how households are the “original seed of the
232
polis.” Ordered homes become the prerequisite for an ordered
state, and households struggling with social issues become a threat to

229. Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1043, 1050–51 (2013).
230. Alec C. Ewald, Collateral Consequences and the Perils of Categorical Ambiguity, in
LAW AS PUNISHMENT / LAW AS REGULATION, supra note 77, at 77, 80.
231. Markus Dirk Dubber, “The Power to Govern Men and Things”: Patriarchal Origins of
the Police Power in American Law, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1277, 1277 (2004). Further, as scholars
Elizabeth Burney and Loraine Gelsthorpe write, “[t]he State traditionally supports the ideal of
well-functioning families, as a crucial element in the social order.” Elizabeth Burney & Loraine
Gelsthorpe, Do We Need A ‘Naughty Step’? Rethinking the Parenting Order After Ten Years, 47
HOW. J. 470, 470 (2008); see also Noa Ben-Asher, The Lawmaking Family, 90 WASH. U. L. REV.
363, 363 (2012) (arguing that families create internal legal systems that govern their daily lives).
232. Dubber, supra note 77, at 30.
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233

that order. Indeed, the connection between home governance and
state governance has a special resonance at the city level, where
Western culture has long mythologized that what happens in the
234
household has a direct impact on the city.
The idea that a failure to govern one’s household is wrongful and
thus may justifiably attract sanctions is particularly salient in the
context of parental liability ordinances. Parental liability ordinances
are often justified based on the intuition that “‘bad’ parents should be
235
disciplined” for their failure to govern their households correctly.
Essentially, the child’s unlawful act demonstrates that the parents are
“bad” at “ruling the roost,” and it is therefore fair to impose penalties
236
on them.
Of course, the implicit assumption underlying the notion that a
child’s unlawful act shows that his or her parents are “bad” is that
237
good parents generally have control over their children. However,
many parents and other people who have worked with or spent time
with children and teenagers believe this assumption to be “unrealistic
238
and naïve.” In reality, parents have quite limited means to actually
control the behavior of their children, and even parents who “do
everything right” may nevertheless have children who engage in
239
misconduct. This is in part because of the myriad factors that
contribute to a child’s behavior, of which parental influence is just

233. This is the flip side to the “notion oft heard that strong families lead to a strong
nation.” MARKEL ET AL., supra note 158, at 1189.
234. The story of Oedipus helps to illustrate this point: his murder of his father created
disorder in his family and household, and thus disorder in the city, in the form of the “plague
upon Thebes.” Levinson, supra note 69, at 354.
235. Amy L. Tomaszewski, Note, From Columbine to Kazaa: Parental Liability in a New
World, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 573, 579 (2005) (citing Linda A. Chapin, Out of Control? The Uses
and Abuses of Parental Liability Laws to Control Juvenile Delinquency in the United States, 37
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 621, 624 (1997)).
236. In other words, a child’s wrongful act justifies a “role [for] politics [] where families
have failed.” F. FIELD, NEIGHBOURS FROM HELL: THE POLITICS OF BEHAVIOUR (2003); John
Flint & Judy Nixon, Governing Neighbours: Anti-Social Behavior Orders and New Forms of
Regulating Conduct in the UK, 43 URB. STUD. 939, 948 (2006) (quoting FIELD, supra).
237. Elena R. Laskin, How Parental Liability Statutes Criminalize and Stigmatize Minority
Mothers, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1195, 1206 (2000).
238. Id.
239. “No doubt family environment exerts significant influence on a child’s behavior. But on
closer examination, scapegoating parents paints a remarkably incomplete picture. Indeed, in
many families, parents may no longer be capable of influencing the behavior of their children.
Many other powerful forces compete today for that role in teenagers’ lives.” Min Kang, Parents
as Scapegoats, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 15, 19 (2007).
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one among many. Another powerful force is enculturation, or the
environment in which children grow up. Most bullying experts will
readily agree that peer groups play an important—if not the most
important—role in whether children engage in bullying behaviors.
Parental liability ordinances, though, appear to be “based entirely on
folk wisdom” that parents should be able to control their children all
241
the time. If they cannot, then they can be “coercively taught
parenting skills, so they will become in control (and presumably then
can be punished by harsher means if the children continue their
242
delinquent behavior).”
In addition to suggesting that a failure to govern one’s household
is blameworthy, home rule ordinances also blame parents and tenants
for a reluctance to be governed. For instance, the narratives
surrounding parental liability laws suggest that they will be levied
243
when cities decide that parents are being uncooperative with them.
In the case of the Monona, Wisconsin, ordinance that holds parents
liable for their children’s bullying behaviors, Monona’s police chief
has indicated that fines will be levied only in situations in which the
parents are uncooperative and do not make efforts to address the
244
bullying. This theme of uncooperativeness also occurs in parental
liability laws at the state level: the proposed, but ultimately defeated,
Iowa bill that sought to hold parents responsible for their children’s
245
bullying was also rooted in parental cooperation with the state. The
first level of intervention was to be notification of the bullying
246
behavior and an attempt to “work[] with the family” to address it. If
parents resisted this intervention, the second level was court

240. “Most criminology and sociology theories, as well as empirical studies, generally
indicate that not only the family, but economic status, academic achievement, racism and
discrimination, peer groups, community attachment and susceptibility to media affects a child’s
propensity” to engage in misconduct. Tammy Thurman, Parental Responsibility Laws: Are They
The Answer to Juvenile Delinquency?, 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 99, 107 (2003).
241. Chapin, supra note 235, at 654.
242. Id. (emphasis omitted).
243. Similar ideas regarding duties to cooperate can be found in the welfare and child
support context. See Naomi Cahn, Representing Race Outside of Explicitly Racialized Contexts,
95 MICH. L. REV. 965, 973–80 (1997).
244. Kuruvilla, supra note 97.
245. H.F. 143, 2013 Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2013), available at http://coolice.legis.iowa.gov/
Cool-ICE/default.asp?Category=billinfo&Service=Billbook&menu=false&hbill=hf143.
246. Leigh, supra note 94.
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mediation. The final level was prosecution, which could result in
248
“community service, fines, or even jail time.”
Penalizing parental uncooperativeness can also be seen in state
laws addressing truancy. A truancy reduction program in Michigan,
for example, provided that when “parents did not cooperate with
school officials, a warrant was sought for parental prosecution under
the state’s compulsory attendance law. The key phrase here was that
249
the parents targeted were uncooperative.”
This same language of cooperation was echoed in a town’s
reasoning regarding enacting a chronic-nuisance ordinance that was
meant to apply to domestic-abuse situations:
It’s always disheartening for police officers to get calls that a
boyfriend is beating up a girlfriend, and then the girlfriend drops the
charges within a few days. It’s more frustrating when the offenders
repeat the process over and over. . . . In addition, it’s a big waste of
taxpayers’ dollars when police have to respond to nuisance calls and
then to court without the benefit of cooperation from those who
250
complained in the first place.

Cooperation also figures into the common practice of ordering
women to get restraining orders against their intimate partners to
251
avoid evictions under nuisance ordinances.
If they refuse to
cooperate and accept this form of city governance, eviction can
follow. Compliance with a state notion of best practices for home
governance becomes a requirement of maintaining stable housing and

247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Justin W. Patchin, Holding Parents Responsible for Their Child’s Bullying,
CYBERBULLYING RES. CENTER (June 17, 2013), http://cyberbullying.us/holding-parentsresponsible-for-their-childs-bullying (second emphasis added). Professor Patchin also noted,
however, that in reality, “[o]nly 3 parents out of the nearly 300 families involved in the program
fell into [the uncooperative] category.” Id. Most parents seem willing to help tackle their
children’s bullying behaviors, as attested to by the fact that the informational brochure entitled
“What If My Child Is The Bully?” is “one of the most frequently downloaded handouts on the
website.” A. Pawlowski, Community Will Ticket Parents of Chronic Bullies, TODAY (June 3,
2013, 1:59 PM), http://www.today.com/moms/community-will-ticket-parents-chronic-bullies6C10172548.
250. Rebecca Licavoli Adams, Note, California Eviction Protections for Victims of Domestic
Violence: Additional Protections or Additional Problems?, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J.
1, 12 (2012) (quoting Ron Gower, Police Calls: Responsibility Will Be Required in Coaldale,
TIMES NEWS, Mar. 13, 2006, at 1).
251. For a discussion of this issue, see Suk, supra note 81, at 7.

SWAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1/26/2015 11:38 PM

868

[Vol. 64:823

DUKE LAW JOURNAL
252

avoiding legal penalty. Failure to cooperate or to be governed in
this regard is portrayed as blameworthy, and thus able to legitimately
attract legal sanctions.
2. Failing to Control Criminality. In the nuisance context, the
failure to govern one’s household is linked to another powerful
narrative of blame: the failure to control another’s violence or
criminality. In addition to placing blame on parents and tenants for
failing to govern their households, when nuisance is based in domestic
violence, a story is told in which an individual’s failure to control
another’s criminality is blameworthy. In this narrative, those who
experience domestic violence are specifically faulted for failing to
253
control their partner’s behavior. According to this story, their
failure to control the abuse is blameworthy and should attract the
sanction of eviction.
Many nuisance citations and evictions come from domestic254
violence incidents. Indeed, a recent groundbreaking study analyzing
all the nuisance citations issued in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in 2008 and
2009 found that nearly a third of these citations were generated by

252. For example, Lakisha Briggs, the Pennsylvania woman who was evicted after her
boyfriend nearly killed her, was, prior to her eviction, “ordered to obtain assistance from the
justice system [in the form of a Protection from Abuse order] as a condition to maintaining her
housing, regardless of her fears of future and escalated violence.” Brief of Amicus Curiae of the
Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence, et al. at 20, Briggs v. Norristown (E.D. Pa.
May 31, 2013) (No. 2:13-cv-2191).
253. This narrative falls into the gendered tradition of holding women responsible for men’s
criminality. This tradition is most obvious in the context of sexual assault, where “to some
extent criminal justice officials (and others) have always considered female victims of sexual
assault and rape as responsible for failing to minimize the opportunities for the offense.” Sharyn
L. Roach Anleu, The Role of Civil Sanctions in Social Control: A Socio-Legal Examination, in
CIVIL REMEDIES AND CRIME PREVENTION 21, 34 (Lorraine Green Mazerolle & Jan Roehl
eds., 1998).
254. Dekalb, Chicago, offers an example of the number of nuisance citations connected to
domestic violence. The city reported that in 2013, it notified landlords of 489 calls to police that
could trigger eviction. Katie Dahlstrom, DeKalb’s Crime Free Housing Program Gets Mixed
Reviews, DAILY CHRONICLE (Feb. 27, 2014, 3:36 PM), http://www.daily-chronicle
.com/2014/02/26/dekalbs-crime-free-housing-program-gets-mixed-reviews/ajjphlv/?page=1. The
reasons for the calls to police were varied. “100 were for disorderly house complaints—loud
parties or noise late at night. Another 97 were domestic battery and 45 were for possession of
marijuana. The remainder ran the gamut from underage drinking to mob action.” Id. Of those,
56 resulted in eviction, 31 resulted in individuals being barred from a particular residence, and
18 tenants left “voluntarily.” Id.
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255

domestic violence. The same study quoted many instances in which
both landlords and the police who worked with them to evict tenants
under the nuisance ordinances blamed female tenants for the
256
“nuisance” associated with domestic abuse incidents. Landlords and
police explicitly “assigned to battered women the responsibility for
curbing the abuse” and often viewed eviction as the natural and fair
257
consequence of a failure to do so. One Milwaukee landlord
(described as “a middle-aged white man who owns 114 units, mostly
in poor black neighborhoods”), offered his views on nuisance
citations related to domestic violence at his properties:
Like I tell my tenants: You can’t be calling the police because your
boyfriend hit you again. They’re not your big babysitter. It
happened last week, and you threw him out. But then you let him
back in, and it happens again and again. Either learn from the first
experience or, you know, leave. Don’t take him back and get hit
because you tell him, I don’t know, “I don’t want to sleep with
258
you.”

Another landlord warned his tenant in a letter:
Because the numerous calls from this address, the police has [sic]
identified the property as a nuisance property. . . . Many of the calls
involved physical altercations with another individual, identified as
your boyfriend and ex-boyfriend who appears to be living at the
unit. . . . This is your notice to cease this behavior and to cure these
problems. . . . If these activities continue, your lease will be
259
terminated.

And in a letter to the Milwaukee Police Department, from whom
260
most of the eviction directives originated, one landlord wrote:
The Tenants have been required to vacate the unit or terminate the
causes via a 30-day [eviction] notice. It does not matter if they are
255. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 118. It should be noted that the study excluded
public housing “[b]ecause the nuisance property ordinance focuses on the private housing
market.” Id. at 123.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 134.
258. Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
259. Id. at 134 (alterations in original) (emphasis added).
260. The nuisance ordinances are usually enforced in the following manner: a city official
who has received a report from the police regarding an incident sends a letter to the landlord,
indicating that the landlord must evict or face a series of escalating sanctions. The landlord is
often requested to write a letter in response indicating what actions have been or will be taken.
Id. at 122.
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the cause of the problems or not. It is their responsibility to prevent
261
the problems at all times.

And in yet another example of a letter to the police, another
local landlord wrote:
First, we are evicting Sheila M., the caller for numerous help [sic]
from police. . . . She has been beaten by her “man” who kicks in
doors and goes to jail for 1 or 2 days. . . . We suggested she obtain a
gun and kill him in self-defense, but evidently she hasn’t. Therefore,
262
we are evicting her.

Leaving aside the profoundly disturbing suggestion in the above
quote—that a woman suffering domestic abuse must engage in the
compliance behavior of shooting her husband to avoid eviction—
these examples suggest that landlords and police construct their own
notions of a tenant’s fault, one rooted in the failure of abused women
to control their intimate partners and stop the violence directed at
263
them. This narrative, and the sentiments behind it, were echoed in
the comments to a New York Times article about domestic violence
and nuisance evictions. One landlord wrote, “‘if the tenant is unwilling
to make better judgments about the men they allow to live with their
264
children, then we feel we have to act.’” According to this narrative,
female tenants who experience domestic abuse are at fault for not
exercising better judgment, for not leaving, and for failing to control
265
the violence of their intimate partners.
B. Vulnerability as Fault
Arguably, the real “nuisance” being targeted in these domesticviolence instances is a person’s vulnerability. A call to 911 is a call for

261. Id. at 135 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
262. Id. (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted).
263. Other examples include a landlord who “noted that a tenant’s 911 abuse calls had to do
with a ‘domestic violence issue that she seems to have no ability to control.’ The landlord
continued, ‘Her lease is up at the end of May and she has been counseled that if her behavior
does not change she will also be non-renewed.’” Id. (emphasis added).
264. Max Liboiron, Twenty-First Century Nuisance Law and the Continued Entanglement of
Race, Gender, Property, and Violence, DISCARD STUD. (Aug. 19, 2013), http://discardstudies
.wordpress.com/2013/08/19/twenty-first-century-nuisance-law-and-the-continued-entanglementof-race-gender-property-and-violence (emphasis added).
265. This is particularly troubling when one considers that domestic violence itself is “a
crime of control.” Adams, supra note 250, at 4 (citing John C. Nelson, Ronald B. Adrine, Elaine
Alpert, Sara Buel & Corinne Graffunder, Domestic Violence in the Adult Years, 33 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 28, 29 (2005)).
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help, an expressed need for assistance. Under the nuisance ordinances,
266
this call is also the basis for eviction. One explicit rationale behind
nuisance ordinances is the idea that the residents in these properties
are overusing the limited resources of police and emergency
personnel; the need that is prompting these visits is cast as
267
excessive.
Indeed, there are important links between vulnerability and
268
home rule ordinances at large. Although home rule ordinances
potentially implicate all parents and tenants that reside in cities that
have passed these ordinances, in practice, “the burden falls
269
disproportionately on a select few.” Due to the demographics of
parents and renters, as well as the manner in which home rule
ordinances are enforced, the “select few” are often members of
270
vulnerable groups. The results of the Milwaukee study, for instance,
suggest that nuisance ordinances are heavily inflected with issues of
271
gender, class, and race. The study authors found that “[p]roperties
in black neighborhoods disproportionately received citations,” and
266. A similar slippage occurs in the nuisance context. The ACLU lawyer representing
Lakisha Briggs told the New York Times: “The problem with these ordinances is that they turn
victims of crime who are pleading for emergency assistance into ‘nuisances’ in the eyes of the
city.” Liboiron, supra, note 264. One academic offers an insightful analysis of this quote,
suggesting that it taps into a long-running historical vein that connects race with nuisance. As he
notes, this “turn of phrase, whereby people—women, and usually black women—are turned into
both a form of pollution and a force that precludes the enjoyment of one’s property,” is “part of a
long historical trend.” Id. (emphasis added).
267. Cari Fais, Note, Denying Access to Justice: The Cost of Applying Chronic Nuisance
Laws to Domestic Violence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 1181–82 (2008).
268. In legal scholarship, group-based ideas of vulnerability are often understood to be in
conflict with “universality-based” ideas of vulnerability. “On the one hand, vulnerability is often
used to analyze specific populations; on the other hand, Martha Fineman has developed a
vulnerability thesis that is expressly universal in its scope and ‘post-identity.’” Lourdes Peroni &
Alexandra Timmer, Vulnerable Groups: The Promise of An Emerging Concept in European
Human Rights Convention Law, 11 INT’L J. CONST. LAW 1056, 1060 (2013). Here, “vulnerable
groups” is meant to convey the idea that certain identity-based groups have historically been
subjected to discrimination, and that although “people are differently vulnerable,” vulnerability
is “partially constructed depending on economic, political, and social processes of inclusion and
exclusion.” Id.
269. Buerger, supra note 54, at 110. A significant portion of the population is parents or
guardians, and over one hundred million tenants live in rental properties nationwide.
“According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2009 American Housing Survey (AHS), there are 38.6
million occupied rental properties in the United States, which more than 100 million tenants call
home.” Hawkins, supra note 14, at 66.
270. Rental housing often conjures up associations with “urban ‘concrete jungles.’” In truth,
though, “the majority of renters live outside city centers, in ‘suburban or nonmetropolitan
areas.’” Hawkins, supra note 14, at 66.
271. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 136–39.
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those located in more integrated black neighborhoods had the highest
272
likelihood of being deemed nuisances. The empirics of the study
were as follows: “[o]f the 503 properties deemed nuisances, 319 were
273
located in black neighborhoods.” The next largest number, 152,
came from mixed neighborhoods, but of these mixed-neighborhood
properties, 124 deemed nuisances were in neighborhoods “in which
the proportion of black residents exceeded that of white or Hispanic
274
residents.” Only 18 properties were deemed nuisances in white
neighborhoods and 14 properties were deemed nuisances in Hispanic
275
neighborhoods.
Nuisance laws also affect other vulnerable group members,
276
particularly the poor and disabled. The New York Times article
setting out the case of Lakisha Briggs also included a brief vignette
277
about William Zarnoth, a sixty-two year old Milwaukee bartender.
He was evicted after too many 911 calls arising from a dispute
278
between his roommates and another tenant in the building. The
eviction record made it difficult for him to find another apartment,
leaving him in an eighty-dollar-per-week room without cooking
279
facilities.
Parental liability ordinances also have their greatest impact on
vulnerable groups, particularly single-parent households, most of
280
which are headed by women. Households with single mothers are
more prevalent than households with two parents and households
with single fathers—leaving single mothers as the persons most likely
281
to be affected by parental liability ordinances. In situations where
“the father-figure leaves the household or was never part of it,” the

272. Id. at 117.
273. Id. at 125.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. For an examination of the impact of the one-strike policy in federal public housing
upon the disabled, see generally Anne C. Fleming, Protecting the Innocent: The Future of
Mentally Disabled Tenants in Federally Subsidized Housing After HUD v. Rucker, 40 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197 (2005).
277. Eckholm, supra note 199.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See Dimitris, supra note 11, at 676 (“Opponents [of parental liability ordinances] argue
that parental responsibility statutes impose fines and imprisonment on parents who already
have problems controlling their child in large part due to their financial shortcomings and lack
of being physically proximate to the child.”).
281. Id. at 675.
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mother will be the one subject to the ordinance because it is she,
rather than the absent parent, who will be regarded as “failing to
282
control” the child.” In fact, single motherhood itself is often
associated with fault. It is commonly perceived as being associated
283
with, or perhaps even causative of, juvenile delinquency. It is
“presented as having a devastating impact on the institution of the
284
family in the first instance and the fate of society in the long run.”
Socioeconomic status also plays a significant role in bullying.
Countries with the highest wealth disparity also have the highest
285
bullying rates. Further, although bullies can be found at every layer
of social strata, they are slightly more likely to come from middle-to
286
low income backgrounds. Also, bullying ordinances may tend to
have their largest impact upon racial minorities, as Carson City,
California, recognized in its decision to not enact an antibullying
287
parental liability ordinance.
Also, although parental liability ordinances subject all parents to
the potential for fines and other escalating legal sanctions, parents
who rent may face the additional consequence of eviction under the
crime-free program. Crime-free lease addendums link the burden of
security with home ownership because only homeowners can rest
assured that they will not be displaced if their friends or family
288
members engage in unlawful activities. Freedom from displacement
becomes a perk of home ownership, whereas those who choose to
rent or must rent for financial reasons are subject to a different set of
interventions.
Often, socioeconomic, gender, and racial divides separate home
renters from homeowners. Vulnerable groups like racial minorities,

282. Id.
283. Fineman, supra note 157, at 960.
284. Id. at 959 (quoting Martha Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991
DUKE L.J. 274, 287 (1991)).
285. Pernille Due et al., Socioeconomic Inequality in Exposure to Bullying During
Adolescence: A Comparative, Cross-Sectional, Multilevel Study in 35 Countries, 99 AM. J. OF
PUB. HEALTH 907, 913 (2009).
286. Neil Tippett & Dieter Wolke, Socioeconomic Status and Bullying: A Meta-Analysis, 104
AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 48, 48 (2014).
287. Part of the opposition to the bill was based in the idea that it could be used in a racially
discriminatory manner, to “further criminalize Black and Brown youth.” Muhammad, supra
note 88.
288. Professor David Garland posits that there are increasing and “developing divisions
between property-owning classes and those social groups who are deemed a threat to property.”
Garland, supra note 44, at 463. Home rule ordinances may be such a distinction.
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women, and the disabled are more likely to live in rental housing, and
289
are therefore most often subject to these ordinances. For instance,
in Illinois, where over one hundred municipalities have adopted
crime-free programs, the percentage of “non-Hispanic white
290
households” that rent is only 25%. In contrast, “59.1% of AfricanAmerican households, 47.4% of Hispanic households, and 38.3% of
291
Asian households rent.” In terms of gender, “[f]emale-headed
households are more than twice as likely to rent as the general
292
population.” And, on a national basis, “41.8% of households with a
nonelderly person with a disability rent, as compared to just 31.6% of
293
households that rent overall.” These households are asked to
shoulder the burden of preventing criminal activity in a way that
members of other groups and homeowners are not. Ironically, these
groups are also the least likely to have the resources available to
engage in robust and successful third-party policing.
Some have argued that “[t]he poor (and perhaps particularly the
working poor) frequently are seen as being at fault, and are found to
294
be negligent or irresponsible if not wholly criminal in their actions.”
There is arguably an element of this in some of the narratives
surrounding home rule ordinances. For instance, there exists a
curious slippage, or a sort of conflation, of the actual wrongdoer with
the person held vicariously liable for that wrongdoing. Rather than
portraying the parent or tenant as the means to an end (that end
being deterrence), parents and tenants are themselves configured as
wrongdoers in a way that connects to vulnerability. In Rucker, for
example, after suggesting that deterrence and enforcement
justifications supported the one-strike policy’s strict-liability nature,
the Court offered a final justification for the imposition of strict
liability: “Regardless of knowledge, a tenant who cannot control drug
crime, or other criminal activities by a household member which

289. WERTH, supra note 123, at 5. These populations were also the most affected by the
precursor to the crime-free lease addendum, the one-strike policy in federal housing. Austin,
supra note 11, at 275–76. For more discussion of the ways in which policies connected to the war
on drugs particularly impact women, see generally Phyllis Goldfarb, Counting the Drug War’s
Female Casualties, 6 J. GENDER, RACE, & JUST. 277 (2002).
290. WERTH, supra note 123, at 5 n.13.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Tyler & Segady, supra note 11, at 89.
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threaten health or safety of other residents, is a threat to other residents
295
and the project.”
Thus, according to the Court, the tenant herself is at fault. She
cannot control drug or other crime, and thus becomes a “threat”
herself, endangering the security of the other tenants and the
296
community at large. Whereas earlier in the opinion the Court held
that “control” merely meant “permitted access to the premises,”
when considering the strict-liability nature of the one-strike policy,
the Court redefined “control” to mean the ability to govern or impose
one’s will upon others—and the lack of control was itself
297
blameworthy. In other words, it is the tenant’s lack of control of
others, her lack of power, or her vulnerability that renders her a
298
threat to security.
C. The Framing Effect
Vicarious liability also performs a powerful framing function for
home rule ordinances. It suggests that the blame for criminal or drugrelated behavior falls upon the individual wrongdoer and his or her
social or familial others, to the exclusion of everything else. As with
the dominant criminal law narrative, the focus in this narrative is very
narrow. The criminal law tends to tell stories of “individuals, as
299
opposed to complex systems and institutions,” and explains crime as
300
a “problem of individual criminal pathology.” It “obscures the
economic and sociological conditions” connected to crime, and

295. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 134 (2002) (emphasis added)
(quotation mark omitted).
296. “Ultimately, according to Rucker, families who are unable or unwilling to control
household members who engage in criminal activities threaten the health and safety of other
residents in the development.” Rodney, supra note 137, at 746. The court in Dayton
Metropolitan Housing Authority v. Kilgore, 958 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011), made a
similar point. Id. at 190.
297. Kilgore, 958 N.E.2d at 189 (quoting Rucker, 535 U.S. at 131).
298. The disease metaphors that surround the social problems of bullying, drugs, and
criminality also contribute to the idea of a shared blameworthiness. These “social ills” are
described as “epidemic, pandemic, and contagious,” and as “viral.” Ahrens, supra note 160, at
1675, 1688. Those words make it easy to imagine members of the same household sharing the
same affliction.
299. Corey Rayburn, To Catch a Sex Thief: The Burden of Performance in Rape and Sexual
Assault Trials, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 437, 468 (2006)
300. Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 624
(2009).
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thereby “relieves ‘pressure on the government and society’” to
301
address these underlying factors.
Vicarious liability in the home rule ordinances widens this frame
ever-so-slightly, so that a wrongdoer’s social or familial others are
also included in the picture. However, additional complex
contributors remain invisible and outside the borders of this new
framing. Social dynamics are erased and recast as “characteristics of
individuals,” and the larger, structural factors that are correlated with
crime and drug abuse—like poverty, economic inequality, and lack of
opportunities—are ignored in favor of a simpler tale, according to
which the individual wrongdoer and his or her family are the entire
302
problem, and that problem can be solved through displacement.
IV. SANCTIONING NONCOMPLIANCE
This Part explores how the vicarious liability nature of home rule
ordinances pulls not just primary wrongdoers into the orbit of
criminalization, but also their familial or social relations. Part IV.A
discusses how those familial or social others then become subject to
the same kinds of stigma that often follow those actually convicted of
crimes. Further, those familial or social others become subject to the
legal sanctions provided for in the ordinances, such as fines and, more
significantly, eviction. Part IV.B addresses the significant negative
consequences associated with employing eviction as a remedy.
Eviction is a difficult event for anyone, but for low-income tenants, it
can be devastating. Indeed, the end result of eviction for low-income
tenants is often homelessness. Imposing eviction—and the resultant
homelessness—on those who are unable to prevent their intimate
others from engaging in wrongful acts implies that their failure has
rendered them unworthy of a home, and thereby creates a “home
rule” regarding who can maintain stable housing.
A. Criminalization and Stigmatization
The crime-free lease addendums and nuisance ordinances
technically make tenants “civilly liable for the alleged criminal

301. Id. (quotations marks omitted).
302. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF,
AUTONOMY AND LAW 73 (2011) (quoting Renée Römkens, Law as a Trojan Horse: Unintended
Consequences of Rights-Based Interventions to Support Battered Women, 13 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 265, 285 (2001).
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303

conduct” of others. The parental liability ordinances go further and
may make parents criminally liable for the alleged unlawful conduct
of their children. All three ordinances have the same effect: tenants
and parents are implicated in the criminality of those in their social
circles and family groups. Crime thus becomes framed as a problem
that results not just from individual pathology but also from the
failure of family and friends to prevent the behavior. The ordinances
“extend responsibility (and more importantly, liability) for
‘community safety’” into the home and onto the shoulders of tenants
and parents, and link the wrongful act with a failure of responsibility
304
on their part. Thus, through vicarious liability, social and familial
relations become implicated in the wrongful act itself. Indeed, this is
the very definition of vicarious liability: it imputes a wrongful act
from one person to another, based on the relationship between
305
them. In the home rule ordinance narrative, then, individual
wrongdoers as well as their social and familial relations are
responsible for any unlawful acts.
Grouping primary wrongdoers with their familial or social others
places all parties beneath the “criminal” umbrella, under which no
306
one is “innocent.” Friends and family members often suffer
“secondary stigma and ostracism” because of their relationship to
307
those convicted of crimes. Home rule ordinances magnify this
stigma, lumping friends and family into the category of “criminal”
despite a lack of individual wrongdoing (and even though the
underlying bad act may not even have constituted a crime in the strict
308
sense).
This is a significant event: “As Professor Alexandra
Natapoff recently observed, for a person who has been publicly
transformed from law-abiding citizen into criminal, a significant
309
psycho-social line has been crossed.” Families become subject to
“othering,” a common practice of social control that systematically

303. Mele, supra note 11, at 124.
304. Id. at 129.
305. SAMAHA, supra note 9, at 229.
306. As one proponent of the crime-free lease addendum asserted, there “is no innocent
resident.” Chaos to Calm with Crime Free Multi Housing, CTR. FOR PROBLEM-ORIENTED
POLICING, http://www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein/2011/11-08.pdf (last visited Jan.
16, 2015).
307. Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1108
(2013).
308. See supra text accompanying note 134.
309. Id. at 1112 (quotation marks omitted).
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denies certain groups “full participation in civil society” and labels
310
them with “pariah status.”
B. Eviction
Although the parental liability ordinances that specify fines as
their attendant sanction are problematic, the stigmatizing and
disenfranchising impact of the eviction sanction renders it an
311
especially devastating event, particularly for low-income tenants.
Homes serve more than just a functional purpose. In addition to
providing physical shelter, homes “can serve as a ‘person’s security,
self-identity, and center for social interaction.’ A home represents a
312
family’s safe haven, . . . ‘a place of privacy and security.’”
Furthermore, “[i]n terms of self-identity, a home can reflect its
occupant’s sense of self. It provides space to develop and express an
313
314
identity.” It provides a place to nurture oneself and others. It is
the site for most familial and many social interactions, a center for
interacting with others. In essence, home is “a means for the physical
and social location of a person, his private life and his social
315
relationships.”
Given all the practical, psychic, and social attachments to home,
it is not surprising that moving is commonly cited as the third most
316
stressful life event, after death and divorce. Eviction, or forced
moving, is even more so, as it lacks the hope or upward mobility
associated with most voluntary moves. Eviction is “a severely
consequential and traumatic event. Researchers have linked eviction

310. Mele & Miller, supra note 183, at 22 (quotation marks omitted).
311. Fines can be very difficult for low-income families to pay. Such sanctions are “insidious
in part because they often are assessed with little to no attention paid to the defendant’s
circumstances,” and therefore, they often result in “severe consequences” for individuals and
families. Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 281
(2014).
312. Heinle, supra note 173, at 229.
313. Id. at 229 n.104 (quoting Megan J. Ballard, Legal Protections for Home Dwellers:
Caulking the Cracks to Preserve Occupancy, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 277, 285 (2006)).
314. Id. at 229.
315. HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander [2002] (Isr.).
316. Jeff Wuorio, Make Your Move Less Stressful, USA TODAY (Jan. 17, 2014, 10:31 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/weekend/living/2014/01/17/make-your-move-lessstressful/4531323.
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to homelessness, material hardship, increased residential mobility, job
317
loss, depression, and even suicide.”
Although eviction is stressful for anyone, those with enough
socioeconomic resources are usually able to find equivalent housing.
For low-income tenants, however, “[t]he mark of eviction on one’s
record often prevents tenants from securing affordable housing in a
decent neighborhood, and it disqualifies them from many housing
318
programs.” Thus, “[f]or many, if not most, low-income tenants,
319
eviction leads to immediate homelessness.” In part, this is because
of the stigmatization associated with evictions:
Evictions carry a stigma. Many landlords will not rent to persons
who have been evicted, and an eviction can also ban a person from
affordable housing programs. Tenants who are evicted often lose not
only their homes but their possessions as well, stripping them of the
few assets they had. Once evicted, tenants often find themselves
320
forced to move from one undesirable location to another.

Crime, mediated through the civil law, serves as the trigger that
321
sets a household on this downward spiral. Just as in the one-strike
317. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 137. Eviction also has a significant negative
impact upon children. It can lead to poorer school performance, increased truancy, and an
increased risk of dropping-out. Matthew Desmond, Weihua An, Richelle Winkler & Thomas
Feriss, Evicting Children, 92 SOC. FORCES 303, 303 (2013). Further, “increased residential
mobility has also been linked to higher rates of adolescence violence and children’s health
risks.” Id. These health risks are exacerbated when evictions force families to relocate to
substandard homes. Id. Indeed, eviction also negatively impacts entire communities. It can
“contribute to neighborhood disadvantage,” “unravel the fabric of a community,” and thwart
“efforts to establish and maintain social capital, local cohesion and community investment.
Eviction, then, can result in negative consequences, not only for children of evicted households,
but also for all children who live in high-eviction neighborhoods.” Id. (citations omitted).
318. Id. Gentrification is also hinted at in the eviction policies. “As a process, gentrification
entails often-intentional displacement of poor residents, class conflict, and, at times, violence.”
Kaplan-Lyman, supra note 41, at 187. It has been suggested that the one-strike policy is
performing similar work in Chicago. One study found that “the number of one-strike cases
across the city increased sharply in CHA developments where demolition was eminent,” and
also rose dramatically in the mixed-income units created to replace those housing units. Caputo,
supra note 221. As one community organizer stated, “These policies are intended to push
people out.” Id.
319. Levy, supra note 12, at 564.
320. Matthew Desmond, Poor Black Women are Evicted at Alarming Rates, Setting Off a
Chain of Hardship, MACARTHUR FOUND. 2 (Mar. 2014) http://www.macfound.org/media/
files/HHM_Research_Brief_-_Poor_Black_Women_Are_Evicted_at_Alarming_Rates.pdf.
321. Indeed, even things that are only “crimelike” serve as triggers. One Las Vegas landlord
describes what triggered a family’s eviction in her building: “Because of our Block Watch
efforts, we helped police find a juvenile who was shooting an air gun in the neighborhood. . . .
Within a couple of days a suspect was apprehended by police from information received from
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policy context, the ability or inability to control crime has become an
“an unacknowledged way” of determining who is or is not worthy of
322
having a home. Home rule ordinances serve as a sorting tool, but
one that only applies to certain portions of the population. This raises
questions of “equity across economic class lines,” for while a renting
family subject to a crime-free lease addendum might find itself
homeless following one member’s “simple possession or use of a
small quantity of cocaine,” for a home-owning middle-class family,
that same offense might result only in judicially mandated drug
323
treatment.
Despite the significance of eviction, and the fact that it is often a
precursor to homelessness for low-income tenants, courts have held
324
that eviction is not technically a “punishment.” For civil crime-free
and nuisance ordinances to be considered “punishment,” the test is
“‘whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or
effect . . . as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy

Stanford Court’s Block Watchers. The Crime Free Lease Addendum was used to evict the
family from the community.” Crime Free Multi-Housing Program: Landlord Training Manual,
LAS VEGAS METRO. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.lvmpd.com/ProtectYourself/CrimeFreeMulti
Housing/tabid/110/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
322. SIMON, supra note 49, at 196.
323. Weil, supra note 11, at 177, 178. Not surprisingly given the demographic of renters and
those affected by home rule ordinances,
[t]he most common family composition in the homeless population is a female with a
child or children. Forty percent of the homeless population is made up of families
with children. Of those families, eighty-four percent are female-headed. Families of
color are particularly likely to be homeless, and more than fifty percent of the
homeless population is African American or Latino. This population is
demographically similar to the population living in subsidized housing, although an
even greater percentage of those living in subsidized housing are families with
children.
Madeline Howard, Note, Subsidized Housing Policy: Defining the Family, 22 BERKELEY J.
GENDER L. & JUST. 97, 103 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
324. Levy, supra note 12, at 558 n.121 (citing City of New York v. Wright, 618 N.Y.S.2d 938,
939 (N.Y. App. Term 1994)). The dissent at the intermediate appellate level in Rucker made a
similar observation:
[E]victions in these circumstances are not punitive. They are remedial. A civil
sanction is punitive when it serves “either retributive or deterrent purposes.” Eviction
serves the classic purpose of a contractual remedy—it returns the parties to “as good
a position as that occupied . . . before the contract was made.” The remedy of eviction
alone is not punitive.
Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’d, Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v.
Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (citations omitted). The fact that the city often requires landlords
to evict on the basis of crime-free lease addendums could, however, change this analysis. See
infra note 334.
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into a criminal penalty.’” Whether a sanction can be classified as a
“punishment” has significant legal consequences, but “[s]uch legal
distinctions . . . likely mean very little” to those upon whom the
326
sanctions are visited. For example, to “a mother who loses her
apartment due to the actions of her son . . . eviction feels clearly
327
punitive.” Paying attention to those who, like the mother referenced
above, are “at the receiving end of these exercises of state power”
reminds us that the “blurring of boundaries” between civil regulation
and criminal punishment is not merely a problem of conceptual
incoherence for legal scholars, but also one of perceptual legitimacy
328
for those subject to such sanctions.
V. CHALLENGING HOME RULE ORDINANCES AND
CREATING NEW POSSIBILITIES
Some of “those who are at the receiving end of these exercises of
state power” have begun challenging home rule ordinances in the
329
courts. Part V.A offers a brief outline of the emerging legal
landscape challenging home rule ordinances. Part V.B examines the
shortcomings of the evidence supporting home rule ordinances, and
suggests alternative approaches the municipalities could consider
instead. These alternative approaches arguably both better target the
social problems motivating the home rules ordinances, and avoid the
negative impacts that the ordinances impose.
A. Challenging Home Rules
Advocates have launched three main avenues of challenge. The
first line of argument is that home rule ordinances exceed the bounds
of the home rule authority grant. The second major basis for
challenging these laws is that they conflict with state laws. The third
ground is that the ordinances violate federal or state constitutions, or
other remedial statutes. In this regard, advocates have had some
325. Levy, supra note 12, at 558 n.121 (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100
(1997)).
326. Id.
327. Id. The eviction policies bear an uncanny resemblance to the “move along” policies
initially employed to force undesirables out of public spaces. Richard C. Schragger, The Limits
of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 372 (2001).
328. Austin Sarat, Lawrence Douglas & Martha Merill Umphrey, On the Blurred Boundary
Between Regulation and Punishment, in LAW AS PUNISHMENT / LAW AS REGULATION, supra
note 77, at 1, 7.
329. Id.
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success arguing that parental liability ordinances violate substantive
due process, crime-free ordinances violate procedural due process,
and nuisance ordinances violate both due process and the First
Amendment.
1. Exceeds Grant of Home Rule Authority. Because home rule
ordinances usually rely upon the grant of home rule authority for
their existence, they are vulnerable to arguments that they exceed the
bounds of that authority. For example, in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, a
group of landlords successfully challenged a mandated crime-free
330
lease addendum. Landlords, like evicted tenants, are often unhappy
with these ordinances for a variety of reasons. First, landlords must
invest both time and money when evicting tenants: the process can be
331
long and legal expenses can total in the hundreds or thousands.
Second, the landlord must serve as a de facto “criminal prosecutor” in
proceedings in which they bear the burden of proving, on a balance of
probabilities, that the “tenant or tenant’s guest performed a criminal
332
act.” This role requires a significant amount of legwork, including
333
gathering evidence like witness testimony, records, and documents.
More fundamentally, landlords may resent having to perform these
activities and evict people whom, either as a matter of business
334
judgment or for personal reasons, they do not wish to evict.

330. Landlords of Linn Cnty. v. City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, No. EQCV069920, available at
http://landlordsoflinncounty.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/07/Chapter-29-Ruling-7-611.pdf.
331. Editorial, Landlord-Tenant Ordinance Fails the Test, GAZETTE (Apr. 3, 2014, 3:09 PM),
http://thegazette.com/2011/07/16/landlord-tenant-ordinance-fails-the-test.
Indeed,
because
crime-free lease addendums (and nuisance ordinances) increase a landlord’s cost of doing
business, they may result in reducing low-income rental housing. Letter from Katherine E.
Walz, Jeremy Bergstrom & Emily Werth, Sargent Shriver Nat’l Ctr. on Poverty Law to
Rockford City Council (Jan. 15, 2013), available at http://povertylaw.org/sites/default/
files/webfiles/Letter%20to%20Belleville%20City%20Council%20on%20Crime%20Free%20H
ousing%20Ordinance.pdf.
332. Richard Magnone, Crime Free Addendums in Illinois, CHICAGOEVICTION.COM (July 7,
2011), http://chicagoeviction.com/2011/07/crime-free-addendums-in-illinois.
333. Id.
334. Indeed, while the one-strike policy allowed housing authorities to evict tenants who
failed to prevent the wrongful actions of others, it did not require that they do so. Housing
authorities were free to use the “innocent tenant” defense if they felt it appropriate. Rachel
Hannaford, Comment, Trading Due Process Rights for Shelter: Rucker and Unconstitutional
Conditions in Public Housing Leases, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 139, 140 (2003). In contrast, cities
often require private landlords to evict on the basis of crime-free lease addendum violations, or
face a series of escalating sanctions.
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The Cedar Rapids landlord association, a nonprofit corporation,
alleged that the ordinance mandating crime-free lease addendums
violated the city’s home rule powers. The home rule grant at issue
gave cities a broad power to “exercise any power and perform any
function . . . appropriate to protect and preserve the rights, privileges,
and property” of the city and “to preserve and improve the peace,
safety, health, welfare, comfort, and convenience of its residents,” but
explicitly excluded “the power to “enact private or civil law governing
335
civil relationships.” The association argued that the ordinance fell
within the exclusion, and the court agreed. The judge held that this
sort of limitation to the freedom of contract between a landlord and a
tenant was indeed an attempt to “enact private or civil law governing
336
civil relationships.”
2. Conflicts with State Law. In addition to the finding that the
city ordinance exceeded home rule authority, the court in Landlords
of Linn County v. City of Cedar Rapids also held that the ordinance
337
was in conflict with the Iowa law setting out grounds for eviction.
The state law provided that “clear and present danger presented by a
338
tenant” was a basis for eviction. The court found that the city’s
expansion of this standard to encompass “all criminal law violations,
including simple misdemeanors,” and to include not only a tenant’s
own violations, but also those committed by guests, even without the
339
tenant’s knowledge, “was not reconcilable” with this state standard.

335. IOWA CODE ANN. § 364.1 (West 1999 & Supp. 2014). Over one hundred years ago,
American cities were granted home rule authority. This authority allows them “to legislate on a
broad range of social and economic policies without prior state legislative approval.” Paul A.
Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1100 (2012). The range
of acceptable legislative areas typically includes those of “local” or “municipal” concern, and
often excludes certain areas like taxing and spending powers, or areas of private or civil law.
DAVID J. MCCARTHY, JR. & LAURIE REYNOLDS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL
26 (5th ed. 2003).
336. Landlords of Linn Cnty. v. City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, No. EQCV069920, available at
http://landlordsoflinncounty.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/07/Chapter-29-Ruling-7-611.pdf. Although the contractual nature of the relationship in this instance rendered the eviction
policy void, the contractual nature of the landlord–tenant relationship led to the opposite result
in Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002). There, the Supreme Court held that because the government
was acting as a landlord, and the basis for eviction was a contractual violation, as a matter of the
private law between landlord and tenant, a strict-liability standard was acceptable. Id. at 136.
337. Landlords of Linn Cnty., No. EQCV069920, at 3.
338. Id.
339. Id.
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Crime-free lease addendums have caused similar state–city
tension in Wisconsin. At one point, Wisconsin rejected the possibility
of cities mandating crime-free lease addendums based in strict
340
liability and created a statutory ban that voids such lease terms.
Under that statute, tenants could not be evicted on a vicarious
341
liability standard for criminal activity on or near the premises.
A parental liability ordinance in a suburb of Cleveland, Ohio,
was also recently struck down on the grounds that it conflicted with a
342
state law. The ordinance did “not require a showing that the parent
specifically knew about or contributed to the child’s violation or
criminal wrong,” and provided that a third offense could result in a
343
180-day jail term for the violating parent. Under the ordinance,
parents could raise the defense that they had taken reasonable steps
to control the child, but the Ohio Court of Appeals held that this was
not enough to reconcile the ordinance with a state statute that
required there to be an underlying “act or omission as a predicate for
344
culpability.”
3. Constitutional and Other Concerns. Municipal parental
liability ordinances have also been challenged on another basis:
substantive due process. In State v. Akers, a statute was found to be
invalid for similar reasons to the Ohio suburb ordinance: it “did not
340. S.B. 466, Wisconsin Landlord Omnibus Bill, § 704.44 (9) (Wis. 2011). See Tim
Ballering, WI Landlord Omnibus Bill, Leases and Criminal Activity, JUST A LANDLORD (Mar.
23, 2012), http://justalandlord.com. Initially, the statute provided that “a residential rental
agreement is void and unenforceable if it does any of the following . . . allows the landlord to
terminate the tenancy of a tenant if a crime is committed in or on the rental property, even if the
tenant could not reasonably have prevented this crime.” Id. This was later modified to void
lease terms that “[a]llow[] the landlord to terminate the tenancy of a tenant based solely on the
commission of a crime in or on the rental property if the tenant, or someone who lawfully
resides with the tenant, is the victim . . . of that crime.” See Tim Ballering, The New Wisconsin
Landlord Tenant Law, Criminal Activity and Leases, JUST A LANDLORD (Oct. 22, 2013),
http://justalandlord.com/2012/03/23/wi-landlord-omnibus-bill-leases-and-criminal-activity.
341. Id.
342. Maple Heights v Ephraim, No. 90237, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2008).
343. See Collins et al., supra note 15, at 1340.
344. Id. It should also be remembered that parents of children who are bullied might have
an available remedy in tort law. For instance, in the Georgia-based case of Boston v. Athearn,
764 S.E.2d 582 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014), parents of a seventh-grader whose classmate created a fake
Facebook page about her brought an action against the classmate and his parents. In Georgia,
parents can be liable for negligence when they “fail[] to exercise reasonable care to prevent a
child under his control from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to third persons, where he
has knowledge of facts from which [they] should reasonably anticipate that harm will otherwise
result.” Id. at 586 n.5 (quoting Assurance Co. of Am. v. Bell, 134 S.E.2d 540, 541 (Ga. Ct. App.
1963) (quotation marks omitted)).
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impose liability on the basis of any act or omission committed by a
parent but instead imposed liability solely because of an individual’s
status as a parent,” and was therefore found to have “violated the due
345
process clause of the state constitution.” A parental liability
ordinance in Trenton, New Jersey, was also struck down on
substantive due-process grounds. There, the court noted that rather
than being an “overriding cause of juvenile misconduct,” parental
influence was simply one factor in a constellation of factors leading to
346
347
such behavior. However, in Williams v. Garcetti, the court rejected
an argument that a similar state parental responsibility law violated
348
due process.
Although there is certainly an argument to be made that crime349
free lease ordinances violate substantive due process, most of the
successful challenges have sounded in procedural due process. In one
350
case, Javinsky-Wenzek v. City of St. Louis Park, two landlords who
were ordered by the city to terminate a tenancy when a small amount
of marijuana was discovered on the premises brought a Section 1983
351
action against the City. In a proceeding seeking a preliminary
injunction against the municipality, the court found that the landlords
were “likely to prove that the City violated their procedural due
process rights,” but were not likely to prove the substantive due
process claim. The court concluded that the ordinance in question
“did not appear sufficiently irrational or outrageous to violate

345. See MARKEL ET AL., supra note 110, at 68
346. Doe v. City of Trenton, 362 A.2d 1200 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967). The court also
noted that, “[w]hile Euripides reminds us that the gods often visit the iniquities of the fathers
upon the children, we are not yet prepared to say that the converse ought to be so.” Id. at 1203..
347. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993).
348. Id. at 577.
349. Privacy and autonomy rights may be implicated, as “[t]he right of an individual to
conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy of his or her own home seems . . . to be the heart
of the Constitution’s protection of privacy.” Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 208 (1996)
(Blackmun J., dissenting), quoted in Heidi Reamer Anderson, Plotting Privacy as Intimacy, 46
IND. L. REV. 311, 311 (2013). Also, “the Supreme Court has enshrined several family-oriented
rights in its jurisprudence, including rights to determine when and where to bear a child; rights
to the care, custody, and control of one’s children; and the right to marry the person of one’s
choice.” Kerry Abrams, What Makes the Family Special, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 23 (2013).
350. Javinksy-Wenzek v. City of St. Louis Park, 829 F. Supp. 2d 787 (D. Minn. 2011).
351. The marijuana was discovered during a search of the tenant’s home, which was
conducted after their adult son, who was “not on the lease and allegedly did not reside at the
property . . . purportedly stole a number of items from a drug dealer, including drugs.” Id. at
790.
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substantive due process,” and that the ruling in Rucker likely would
352
stand as a rational basis for it.
Procedural due process has also successfully been raised against
353
nuisance ordinances. In Cook v. City of Buena Park, the court held
354
that a nuisance ordinance violated procedural due process. There,
the city had ordered a landlord to evict all the occupants of a rental
unit after a tenant’s roommate had been cited for “possession of drug
355
paraphernalia.” The roommate successfully completed a drugtreatment program, which resulted in no criminal conviction, but the
356
city nevertheless wished to proceed with an eviction. The court
found that the ordinance at issue was constitutionally infirm because
“the notice requiring the landlord to institute unlawful detainer
proceedings provided insufficient information to prosecute the
action,” “the 10-day period was inadequate for the landlord to garner
evidence to support its eviction action,” and “the ordinance required
the landlord to prevail in the eviction action or face fines, penalties, a
357
lien on his or her property, and even misdemeanor punishment.”

352. Id. at 796. The argument that the one-strike policy “violates the substantive due process
norm of individual guilt, which is fundamental to our concept of justice, and deeply embedded
in our nation’s history and traditions” was rejected in Rucker. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the
American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Northern California, in Support of
Respondents at 3, Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (Nos. 00-1770,
00-1781), 2001 WL 1699135, at *7.
353. Cook v. City of Buena Park, 23 Cal. Rprtr. 3d 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
354. Id. at 701.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. But see City of Peoria v. Danz, 2011 Ill. App. LEXIS 100819, at *1 (upholding a
differently worded nuisance ordinance). In the nuisance context, it has been noted that cities
have been attempting to indirectly accomplish through landlords what due process precludes
them from doing directly. For instance, as attorney Sara Rose noted in the Lakisha Briggs case,
“It was clear even to Norristown that a government entity cannot unilaterally kick someone out
of their home without due process . . . so instead, they are trying to kick people out of their
homes without due process by penalizing landlords if they don’t evict.” Anna Stolley Persky,
Ordinance That Evicts Tenants for Seeking Police Aid Is Putting Abused Women out on the
Street, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 1, 2013, 8:50 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
ordinance_that_evicts_tenants_for_seeking_police_aid_is_putting_abused_wome. Indeed, in the
accompanying legal proceedings, the city acknowledged that the evictions would be
unconstitutional if they attempted to do them directly. Debra Cassens Weiss, Do Laws That
Encourage Eviction for Repeated 911 Calls Violate First Amendment? ACLU Presses Case,
A.B.A. J. (Sep. 19, 2013, 1:26 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/do_laws_that_
encourage_eviction_for_repeated_911_calls_violate_first_amendm. The ordinances thus appear
to provide cities with a way “to exploit the apparently ‘private’ sphere in order to engage in
unquestionably illegal activity,” a phenomenon that has been identified in the rendition context
at the international level, and appears to be repeating here at the smaller, local level, as well.
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A concurring judge in Cook v. Buena Park suggested that the
ordinance might also violate substantive due process. The judge noted
that in addition to the procedural due-process claim, there were
“other, more fundamental” constitutional concerns, including the
ordinance’s “sweeping requirement that all occupants of the premises
must be evicted for the sins of one,” the “disparate treatment of
property owners and renters” (particularly since the court’s “record
reflect[ed] no nuisance abatement efforts against the owners of
property for similar crimes”), and the “Damoclean substantive due
358
process issue” looming “over this statutory scheme.”
In addition to the due-process concerns identified in Cook v.
Buena Park, nuisance ordinances have also attracted challenges on
359
other constitutional grounds related to domestic violence. In East
Rochester, New York, two female victims of domestic violence sued
the city on the basis that the nuisance ordinance stopped them from
360
calling police for assistance, out of fear of being evicted. The
impugned ordinance required landlords to evict tenants if there were
three calls to police requesting assistance at the premises within
twelve months, and explicitly included calls made for domestic
violence, with no exception made for calls initiated by the person
361
victimized by the behavior. The plaintiffs claimed that their First
Amendment “right to petition for a redress of grievances” was
violated, and the suits were settled with a one hundred thousand
362
dollar payment and a change to the ordinances.
The case that the ACLU brought against Norristown,
Pennsylvania, on behalf of evicted tenant Lakisha Briggs, also
resulted in a settlement. Like the plaintiffs in East Rochester, the
ACLU argued that the ordinances violated Lakisha Briggs’s dueprocess rights and her First Amendment “right to petition for a
Fiona de Londras, Privatized Sovereign Performance: Regulating in the ‘Gap’ Between Security
and Rights?, 38 J.L. & SOC’Y 96, 97 (2011).
358. Cook v. City of Buena Park, 126 Cal. App. 4th 1, 23 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (Besworth, J.,
concurring). “Damoclean” is a reference to a figure in Greek mythology. Damocles was forced
to sit with a sword suspended above his head, held only by one hair.
359. Both landlords and tenants have potential claims against nuisance ordinances.
Landlords may argue that the “threats of fines, property seizure, and jail time” imposed by the
ordinances violate the Fourth Amendment. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 138.
360. Persky, supra note 357.
361. Second Amended Complaint at 1, Grape v. Town/Village of East Rochester, No. 07 CV
6075 CJS (F), available at http://www.nhlp.org/files/Grape%20WDNY%20nuisance%202d%20
compl.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
362. Persky, supra note 357.
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redress of grievances.” The case settled for $495,000, the repeal of
the offending ordinances, and a promise not to enact a similar law in
364
the future.
This advocacy led to the repeal of nuisance ordinances in
additional Pennsylvania cities, such as Mount Oliver and Forest
365
City. Indeed, raising awareness of this issue ultimately led to a
statewide law in Pennsylvania. Like laws prohibiting landlords from
evicting tenants for reasons related to domestic violence that have
been enacted in California, Colorado, Minnesota, Wisconsin,
366
Washington, and New Mexico, the Pennsylvania law provides
“protection for any resident, tenant, or landlord who faces penalty
under a local ordinance because police or emergency services were
called or responded to a situation where intervention was needed in
367
response to abuse, crime, or an emergency.” This state law also
“authorizes residents and landlords to seek remedies in court against
368
any municipality that violates these protections.”
The Norristown case also attracted action at the federal level.
The federal government brought a complaint against Norristown,
alleging that the city’s nuisance ordinance violated the Fair Housing
Act “by discriminating against domestic violence survivors, the vast
369
majority of whom are women.” The complaint resulted in a
conciliation agreement “that requires training and ongoing
370
monitoring of Norristown’s activities.”

363. Id.
364. Michaela Wallin, Victims of Crime No Longer Have to Fear Calling 911 in
Pennsylvania, ACLU (Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/victims-crime-nolonger-have-fear-calling-911-pennsylvania.
365. Id.
366. Justin Henry Lubas, The Lack of Protection Available to Victims of Domestic Violence
in Private Housing, 13–18 (Seton Hall Law eRepository, Student Scholarship, Paper No. 264,
2013). New York is also poised to pass a similar law. Wallin, supra note 364.
367. Wallin, supra note 364.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id. The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) may also provide an avenue of
challenge. It forbids “evicting tenants from federal housing for lease violations or criminal
activity related to domestic abuse,” and some state and local laws have extended this protection
to private housing as well. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 139. Consistent with VAWA,
the statute authorizing the use of the one-strike policy contains an exception for domestic
violence victims. After the Rucker decision, the statute was amended to provide protections to
domestic violence victims. However, a lease can nevertheless be terminated if “the domestic
violence poses an actual or imminent threat to others.” Robert Hornstein, Teaching Law
Students to Comfort the Troubled and Trouble the Comfortable: An Essay on the Place of
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Given these successes on the state and federal level, it seems
likely that the use of carve-outs for domestic violence in nuisance and
371
crime-free ordinances will increase. The question then becomes
whether this carve-out will end up strengthening or weakening the
372
remaining home rules edifice. Although there is a possibility that
any domestic-violence exclusions could ironically serve to strengthen
home rules, the increasing public awareness about these ordinances
and the associated problems could ultimately lead to their disuse and
373
demise. Despite the domestic-violence exclusion in the nuisance and
crime-free ordinance context, the many problems with home rule
ordinances in general remain, including their reliance on vicarious
liability standards that offend notions of fundamental justice, their
distributional impact on vulnerable populations, and their overall
374
destabilizing and disruptive impact on families. Some courts have
begun to denounce these ordinances, and as the public becomes more
aware of them and begins to understand that they are “not an easy
panacea for local problems but rather are fundamentally problematic
Poverty Law in the Law School Curriculum, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1057, 1074 n.86 (2009)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(t)(6)(A)–(E) (2012)).
371. Although only four of the municipalities examined in the Milwaukee study excluded
domestic violence from the list of qualifying nuisance activities (Chicago, Madison, Phillipsburg,
and the Village of East Rochester), and thirty-nine ordinances included “assault, sexual abuse,
battery, or domestic violence among their list of nuisance activities,” the advocacy successes on
this front will likely result in a shift in these numbers. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 144, at 3.
372. A domestic-violence exclusion is obviously a positive step towards mitigating the
impact of these ordinances on victims of domestic violence, but it is not a perfect one. Emily
Werth notes that,
[b]ecause of the complex ways in which domestic abuse plays out, many cases
involving victims remain likely to fall through the cracks of such protective language.
E.g., often when a victim of abuse calls for police help, her abuser gets arrested for
crimes that are not self-evidently related to domestic violence or the victim herself
even winds up being arrested; the protections incorporated in ordinances usually do
not account for these realities. Victims whose immediate focus is on safety for
themselves and their children may not be able to take advantage of protective
language even if it clearly would apply to their situation.
Emily Werth, Stemming the Tide of Crime-Free Rental Housing and Nuisance-Property
Ordinances, 47 J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 349, 350 n.5 (2014).
373. Several advocacy groups, including the ACLU and the Shriver Center, have “launched
a national campaign called I am Not a Nuisance, aimed at raising awareness of the collateral
damage caused by such ordinances and pressuring more states and municipalities to add
additional protections for [domestic violence] victims.” Rebecca Burns, Under Local Laws, 911
Calls Turn Domestic Abuse Victims into ‘Nuisances,’ AL JAZEERA AM. (Dec. 8, 2014, 5:00 AM),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/12/8/nuisance-ordinancesdomesticviolencevictims
.html. Also, public awareness recently played a role in defeating an antibullying parental
liability ordinance in Carson City, California. See Muhammad, supra note 88.
374. For an argument that the Fair Housing Act preempts crime-free and nuisance
ordinances, see Wroe, supra note 16.
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policies that can generate a host of harmful effects” for tenants,
families, and communities, municipalities may start turning away
from home rule ordinances and towards alternative methods of
375
addressing social problems.
B. Creating New Possibilities
1. Questioning the Efficacy of Home Rules. Municipalities should
ask two questions when considering home rule ordinances: “‘are these
376
policies just’ and ‘will they work.’” Ideally, the answer to both
questions should be yes, but in the case of the home rule ordinances,
the answer to both is arguably no. In any event, the fact that home
rule ordinances are at least questionable in the first category means
that they stand “in need of substantial justification” and the “will they
377
work” question thus assumes special importance. Unfortunately,
there is a dearth of information as to the effectiveness of home rule
ordinances. Although some anecdotal evidence exists, the kind of
sustained scientific studies that ideally anchor new laws and policies
378
have not yet been conducted.
In regard to parental liability laws, the lack of research means
that it is virtually “impossible to speak about whether they are a good
379
tool or not.” No reliable research assessing the efficacy of parental
liability statutes has been conducted, so we simply do not know much
380
about their impact. We do, however, know that there is a link
between poor parenting and juvenile misconduct. One study found
that a “lack of parental supervision, parental rejection and parentchild involvement, [were] among the most powerful predictors of
381
juvenile conduct problems and delinquency.” However, other
375. Werth, supra note 372, at 25.
376. Garnett, supra note 57, at 1112.
377. See MARKEL ET AL., supra note 110, at xiii.
378. This is part of a troubling trend in governance. As Garland notes, “there is now a
recurring gap between research-based policy advice and the political action which ensues.”
Garland, supra note 44, at 462. A similar gap between policy and empirics can be seen in the
broken-windows policing literature. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE
FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 8 (2001) (discussing the fact that “the famous
broken windows theory has never been verified”).
379. Patchin, supra note 249.
380. Id.
381. Ralph Loeber & Magda Stouthamer-Loeber, Family Factors as Correlates and
Predictors of Juvenile Conduct Problems and Delinquency, in 7 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN
ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 29–149 (M.H. Tonry & N. Morris eds., 1986) (quotation mark
omitted).
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powerful predictors that do not involve parenting have also been
identified. A “high cost of living, poor standards of education,
inadequate recreation, and slums,” as well as peer groups, have also
been acknowledged as powerful predictors of problematic youth
382
behavior. There is no compelling evidence that choosing to target
parenting instead of these other contributing factors will resolve the
issue of youth misconduct. Nor is there evidence that punishing
383
parents is an effective means of improving parenting skills.
Anecdotally, though, Silverton, Oregon, has claimed that after
enacting its parental liability law, the town “experienced a 44.5384
percent reduction in juvenile crime and reduced levels of truancy.”
On the other hand, an older U.S. Department of Health, Education
and Welfare study comparing the juvenile crime rate in sixteen states
with civil parental liability laws against the crime rate in states
without them found that the juvenile crime rate in those sixteen states
385
was “slightly higher than the national average.” Without a definitive
empirical study supporting the proposition that parental liability laws
decrease youth crime, dueling anecdotal evidence does not seem to
386
justify the imposition of parental liability ordinances.

382. Weil, supra note 11, at 181.
383. JOHN HOWARD SOC’Y OF ALTA., supra note 96. “‘We find no evidence that punishing
parents has any effect whatsoever on the curbing of juvenile delinquency . . . . Imprisonment
means breaking up the family; fining means depriving the child and family of sustenance.’”
Gilbert Geis & Arnold Binder, Sins of Their Children: Parental Responsibility for Juvenile
Delinquency, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 303, 319 (1991) (alteration in original)
(quoting Paul Alexander, Tort Responsibility of Parents and Teachers for Damage Caused by
Children, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 165 (1965)). Judge Alexander presided over more than a
thousand cases of contributing to juvenile delinquency in the 1930s and 1940s. Id.
384. Parental Responsibility Laws, JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM INITIATIVES IN THE STATES
1994-1996, http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/reform/ch2_d.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
385. Id. (citing Toni Weinstein, Visiting the Sins of the Child on the Parent: The Legality of
Criminal Parental Responsibility Statutes, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 863, 878 (1991).
386. See id. Interestingly, one study of juveniles in detention centers focused on how those
juveniles perceived parental responsibility. Eve M. Brank & Jodi Lane, Punishing My Parents:
Juveniles’ Perspectives on Parental Responsibility, 19 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 333, 333–34
(2008). The demographics of the study suggest who is most likely to be impacted by parental
liability ordinances: the sample of 147 children “was mostly African American (44%),” and
“prior to living at the juvenile facility, 50.3% lived with their mother as the only parental
figure.” Id. at 338–39. The next largest category was Caucasian (35%), followed by “Hispanic
(not Cuban) at 8%,” and biracial or multiracial kids at 7%. Id. at 338. 20.4% lived with both
parents, and 6.8% lived with just their fathers. Id. at 339. The youths were asked “how
responsible do you think your parent(s) were for your activities that led to the arrest” and
75.5% responded with “not at all responsible.” Id. at 342. However, 87.8% said that they would
have been “less likely” to commit a crime if they knew that their parent(s) “would also be
punished” for it. Id.
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The efficacy of crime-free lease addendums and nuisance
ordinances suffers from a similar lack of knowledge. First, it should
be noted that proponents of crime-free housing ordinances often
justify them on the basis that they are an appropriate response to the
pressing social problem of high-crime rates in rental housing.
However, these ordinances are sometimes passed as a means of crime
prevention, rather than crime reduction, meaning that they are
enacted in communities where crime is a rare occurrence. Instead,
these communities enact these laws using the specter of a potential
crime problem that could arise in the absence of these laws. For
instance, Orland Park, a suburb of Chicago that enjoys a very low
crime rate, recently adopted a crime-free ordinance. The mayor
explained the reasons for its enactment: “It’s not so much that there’s
major problems, but there are some problems, and we want to avoid
387
problems in the future.” One landlord expressed skepticism that the
purpose of the ordinance was at all connected to crime, pointing out
that Orland Park’s particular ordinance “defines room sizes and how
many beds are allowed per room. ‘There are things in there that I
don’t think are relative to being crime-free,’ she said. ‘I mean, how
388
much crime do we really have in Orland Park?’” Further, although
Orland Park specifically acknowledged that crime was not a pressing
social problem for its community, it should be noted that many cities
claiming to suffer from heavy crime associated with rental housing
rarely offer any statistics regarding the amount of crime on rental
389
properties versus owner-occupied properties.
387. Carmen Greco Jr., Orland Park Ordinance Requires Eviction of Troublesome Tenants,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 23, 2009, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-01-23/news/0901210789_1_
ordinance-landlords-problem-tenants.
388. Id.
389. For example, in Belleville, Illinois, “the program was implemented to help reduce
crime in rental housing,” but “figures for criminal incidents in rental property were not
immediately available.” Jacqueline Lee, How is the Belleville Crime-Free Program Doing?
BELLEVILLE NEWS, Jan. 28, 2014, http://www.bnd.com/so14/01/29/3029378/committee-willmeet-to-evaluate.html. Once the program started, there were 260 rental incidents in a twomonth period, “ranging from loud music to marijuana possession to failure to register as a sex
offender,” and of those incidents, “12 resulted in evictions.” Id. An article on Orland Park had a
similar combination of a belief in high-crime rates for rental housing along with a lack of actual
evidence to support that claim. Greco, supra note 387. The article describes how city “[o]fficials
say crimes such as drug offenses, domestic disturbances and weapons violations come mainly
from the village’s 2,100 rental properties, although the village did not cite statistics.” Id.
Similarly, the United Kingdom has “made tackling anti-social behavior a priority,” even though
“the actual evidence from the Survey of English Housing and the British Crime Survey about
the extent to which vandalism, graffiti, nuisance neighbours and teenagers ‘hanging around’
have become more serious problems in neighborhoods over the past 10 years is inconclusive.”
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Nevertheless, at least some communities do seem to experience
higher crime rates associated with rental properties. Unfortunately, it
is difficult to assess whether crime-free and nuisance ordinances help
390
to reduce the crime associated with these residential units.
Although some anecdotal evidence exists, it suffers from two
significant flaws. First, the most commonly used metric is not actually
a reduction in crime. Instead, it is a reduction in the number of calls
for police assistance. For instance, in Collinsville, Illinois, a Crime
Free Housing Program Coordinator reported that “results from the
first year of the program show a 30 percent reduction in calls to police
in ‘hotspots’ or troubled property areas.” However, during that same
time period, the overall crime rate in “Collinsville increased by 4.2
percent,” suggesting that calls for police assistance and actual crime
391
rates may be divergent phenomena. Similarly, the study of nuisance
ordinances in Milwaukee raised the possibility that measures like
home rule ordinances simply encourage less reporting of crime, rather
392
than less actual crime.
Second, the anecdotal evidence does not isolate the impact of
eviction policies on the crime rate. The crime-free program is a
multipronged approach, involving landlord training, environmental
changes, and other interventions. Because much of the anecdotal
evidence does not separate out the strands of a multipronged
approach, it is very difficult to say which portion of any decrease in
crime rates is attributable to the eviction policy and which portion is
attributable to other interventions. Although some cities report
having significant success with the program, these variations and flaws

John Flint & Judy Nixon, Governing Neighbours: Anti-Social Behavior Orders and New Forms
of Regulating Conduct in the UK, 43 URB. STUD. 939, 939 (2006).
390. It is also unclear whether individuals and families living in neighborhoods that most
suffer the harms associated with crime support these kinds of ordinances. Some anecdotal
evidence suggests they do. It is entirely possible, however, that something similar to the “urban
frustration argument” that Richard Brooks described is occurring. He argued that the belief that
the Chicago antigang ordinance was supported by the most impacted minority communities was
false. As he writes:
[C]laims of strong community support for Chicago’s gang-loitering ordinance have
been challenged by Albert Alschuler and Stephen Schulhofer: “The truth is that the
anti-loitering ordinance was intensely controversial, . . . and that to the extent one can
identify any predominant view, Chicago’s anti-loitering ordinance was opposed by the
very groups . . . identif[ied] as its principal supporters.”
Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal Enforcement and Perceptions of
Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1233 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
391. Livanos, supra note 16, at 108.
392. Desmond & Valdez, supra note 42, at 136.
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in methodologies and metrics make it difficult to draw any
393
conclusions from the anecdotal data. In the absence of reliable
empirical research demonstrating that home rule ordinances are an
effective means of targeting the problems of bullying, criminality, and
drug abuse that prompted them, it is difficult to justify the use of
these ordinances.
2. Alternative Approaches. In the face of this lack of evidence
regarding the effectiveness of home rule ordinances, there is a body
of research suggesting that not only may they be ineffective, they may
actually be counterproductive. Sociological and criminological studies
suggest that
dense and robust networks of community ties and mutual trust,
among individuals and at the community level, leads to lower levels
of criminality. Basic social ties—family, friends, school, and
employment—form the building blocks of informal social control,
and at the individual level, robust social, familial, and economic ties

393. Discrepancies in anecdotal reporting are common, and because each city uses different
variables to measure any reduction in crime rates, it is difficult to compare statistics. One source
alleges that Mesa, Arizona, (where the program began) had a drop in crime or calls to police of
approximately 40 percent. DIANNA GRAVES, U. REGINA CMTY. RES. UNIT CRIME-FREE
MULTI-HOUSING PROGRAM: RESEARCH SUMMARY 5 (Apr. 2011), available at
http://ourspace.uregina.ca/bitstream/handle/10294/3427/CFMH%20Summary.pdf?sequence=1.
However, another source states that the drop in crime in Mesa, Arizona, was closer to 75
percent. Josie Lee Villa, The Relationship Between Police and Citizen Collaboration Regarding
Crime in Multi-Family Rental Complexes 29 (2011) (unpublished M.S. thesis, University of
Missouri–Kansas City). Two Canadian cities, New Westminster and Victoria, reported a
reduction in crime of approximately 40 percent, but each used a different metric. New
Westminster used certain kinds of “priority calls,” and Victoria used a number of different
categories. GRAVES, supra, at 5. In other anecdotal reporting, one newspaper article suggests
that crime-free lease addendums were effective in lowering calls to police in Des Moines,
Washington. Keith Daigle, Des Moines Rescinds Charges to Rental Property Owners for Crime
Free Housing Program, HIGHLINE TIMES, Feb. 25, 2010, http://www.highlinetimes.com/
2010/02/25/news/des-moines-rescinds-charges-rental-property-owners-crime-free-housingprogram. The article states that “there was a 48 percent decrease in calls to rental properties
between 2004 and 2008 [the ordinance was enacted in 2005], as compared to a 36 percent
increase in citywide calls. Also, between 2004 and 2008, serious and violent crimes . . . went
down 41 percent, compared to a 14 percent citywide decrease.” Id. Also, San Leandro says it
experienced “a huge drop in crime at these communities.” CTR. FOR PROBLEM-ORIENTED
POLICING, supra note 306. And Champlin, a city of 23,000 people in Minnesota, attests that the
result there was a 36 percent “overall reduction to calls for service and crimes.” Crime Free
Program Testimonials, INT’L CRIME FREE ASSOC., http://www.crime-free-association.org/
testimonials.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).

SWAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

1/26/2015 11:38 PM

HOME RULES

895

are causally related to an individual’s avoidance of criminal
394
behavior.

Home rule ordinances, while trying to leverage those bonds,
actually stress and weaken the “familial and social ties that work to
395
curb criminal behavior.” Further, the end result of many evictions
under these ordinances is homelessness, a status that has been
directly correlated to an increase in criminality and to a negative
396
impact upon communities.
If strong familial and social bonds and a stable home work to
curb criminal behavior, then ordinances and policies should be
initiated with this in mind. One appellate court noted that society has
an interest in “safeguarding the family unit from unnecessary
fractional pressures,” and individuals should not be made to choose
397
between familial devotion or legal fealty. Instead of reflexively
implementing laws like home rule ordinances, cities should first focus
on targeting social problems through means and methods that do not
involve penalizing people for the actions of others.
For instance, in the context of bullying, rather than implementing
parental liability ordinances, cities could direct their resources to
398
“assist[ing] parents in need.” Instead of chalking up juvenile
misconduct to “bad” parenting, an innovative city might try
embracing a multipronged approach that targets some of the broader
issues underlying juvenile misconduct, like a “lack of parenting skills,
399
resources and community support.” This kind of approach could
include things like “parenting skills programs, readily accessible
daycare and access to social programs,” and it could have a much

394. Levy, supra note 12, at 569–70 (footnotes omitted).
395. Id. at 570.
396. Research indicates that homelessness is also directly linked to reincarceration of people
who have served jail or prison sentences. For instance, homeless individuals on parole have
been shown to be seven times more likely to abscond after the first month of release than those
located in more permanent housing. Access to affordable housing has also been linked to
decreased crime rates in low-income communities where people with criminal records often
reside. Although reconnection with family members and establishing community connections
can help reduce reincarceration, legal bars to allowing a family member back into the home
after a conviction often make this impossible. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N SPECIAL COMM. ON
COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES
OF
CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS,
RE-ENTRY
AND
REINTEGRATION: THE ROAD TO PUBLIC SAFETY 219 (2006), available at http://www.nysba.org/
WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=26857.
397. MARKEL ET AL., supra note 110, at 43.
398. Parental Liability Laws, supra note 96.
399. Id.
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more positive effect than the punitive consequences of parental
400
liability ordinances. Rather than simply blaming parents, tackling
some of the broader, structural issues through investment in
“adequate housing for low-income families, quality kindergarten
programs, support for single parent families, community centres,”
child care, and after-school programs would enhance the goal of
community security while creating an environment more conducive to
401
human flourishing.
Programs that offer group counseling and mentoring to youths
could also be useful in reducing juvenile crime and violence. A recent
controlled study of a program that used group counseling and
“nontraditional sports activities to strengthen adolescents’ socialcognitive skills” found that the intervention “improved school
performance and engagement” and resulted in a 36 percent reduction
402
in arrests. Further, the program had an “extremely high” return on
investment: its benefits were estimated to be up to thirty-one times
the cost of its implementation, depending on how the societal benefit
403
was measured.
In the context of crime more broadly, interventions that use
focused direct deterrence, supplemented with family support, job
training, and other forms of assistance have been remarkably
404
successful at curbing crime in a number of cities. For instance, many
cities with high homicide rates were able to lower those rates after
400. Id. Of course, as more cities move toward bankruptcy, these possibilities may become
more difficult. See generally Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J.
1118, 1120 (2014) (discussing the financial difficulties cities have experienced following the 2008
recession and the subsequent reduction in services).
401. Parental Liability Laws, supra note 96. Although these measures would likely be
appropriate for the majority of households, there may be a residual category of parental
behavior that could be effectively addressed through a modified parental liability ordinance.
When a parent’s behavior actively enables or encourages the bullying or wrongful act, some sort
of minor civil penalty could be appropriate. Such an approach should, for the most part, track
the approach used toward secondary liability in the criminal law. See generally GABRIEL
HALLEVY, THE MATRIX OF DERIVATIVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY (2012) (discussing the
development and theoretical grounding of criminal law’s treatment of personal and derivative
forms of liability).
402. William Harms, Study: Chicago Counseling Program Reduces Youth Violence,
Improves School Engagement, UCHICAGO NEWS (July 13, 2012), http://news.uchicago.edu/
article/2012/07/13/study-chicago-counseling-program-reduces-youth-violence-improves-schoolengagemen.
403. Id.
404. David Kennedy describes how such an intervention can work in DAVID KENNEDY,
DON’T SHOOT: ONE MAN, A STREET FELLOWSHIP, AND THE END OF VIOLENCE IN INNERCITY AMERICA (2012).

SWAN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

1/26/2015 11:38 PM

HOME RULES

897

law enforcement personnel held meetings with offenders and their
families during which law enforcement indicated that any further
involvement in crime would result in heavy penalties, and that jobtraining support, housing help, and other forms of community
assistance were immediately available to help transition to a crime405
free life.
Similarly, lessons from the public housing context suggest that a
primary focus on fostering opportunities and targeting the underlying
factors associated with misconduct, criminality, and drug abuse may
be effective in some instances. Public housing authorities that have
successfully transitioned from sites of extreme crime and violence to
sites of decent housing have used evictions only sparingly and instead
relied mainly on initiatives like “educational, anti-drug, resident
participation, recreation, and scholarship programs,” and “renovation
of housing units, increased security, and youth [and] tutoring”
406
programs to accomplish their transformations.
Renovating housing units and improving the physical
environment of buildings and neighborhoods has been associated
with reduced crime rates. After upgrading the lighting and
landscaping for one large apartment building that had been riddled
with “youth gang violence, vandalism and drug trafficking,” and
building a playground, basketball court, and community center for
407
the complex, there was a significant decrease in crime in the area.
Likewise, literally “cleaning up” the streets of a neighborhood often
cleans up the streets in terms of crime reduction as well. Examples
abound in which neighborhoods that invest in repairing streets,
clearing debris, weeding, and better maintaining lots and alleys
408
experience a subsequent drop in crime.

405. Id.; see also TRACEY MEARES ET AL., HOMICIDE AND GUN VIOLENCE IN CHICAGO:
EVALUATION AND SUMMARY OF THE PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS PROGRAM 3 (Jan.
2009).
406. As Weil explains, “public housing success stories” from cities like Chicago, Omaha,
and Pawtucket, Rhode Island, show that “strict eviction policies alone are not responsible” for
helping those sites improve. Instead, “increased spending on security and social programming,”
along with environmental upgrades like “provision of twenty-four hour foot patrols, police
substations, improved lighting, identification card systems and single security entrances to
buildings” were a crucial part of the success achieved. Weil, supra note 11, at 186.
407. Safer Neighborhoods Through Community Policing: Volume 1: Successful Initiatives in
72 Cities, U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS 23–24 (2001), http://www.usmayors.org/bestpractices/
community_policing_0401/safe_neighborhoods_1.pdf.
408. Id.
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Cities can do better than home rule ordinances rooted in
vicarious liability. Local governments are currently imposing thirdparty policing through vicarious liability as a one-size-fits-all solution
to social problems that have diverse causes and factors, and likely
need diverse, nuanced solutions. Fortunately, cities have previously
demonstrated their capacity to address social problems through
creative innovations, and they should once again harness that energy
to come up with new solutions, rather than implementing ordinances
409
that further marginalize and destabilize already vulnerable groups.
Cities have rightly identified the home as an important site in the
fight against bullying, criminality, and drug abuse. However, cities
should explore and implement policies that strengthen familial, social,
and community ties, and promote stable housing, rather than policies
that lead to increased destabilization, disruption, and broken familial
and social connections.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has held that the “right to maintain control”
over one’s home, and “to be free from governmental interference” is
410
a “private interest of historic and continuing importance.” Now,
however, home rule ordinances are transforming the right to control
one’s home into a duty to control all the people connected with that
home, and deter them from engaging in wrongful conduct. That duty
is supported by legal sanctions that apply if one fails to properly
perform her third-party policing role. Although “even in the freest of
societies, coercion may be a necessary evil,” one must nevertheless
“guard against instinctive prescription of coercive solutions to every
411
problem or crisis that emerges.” Ideally, proposed policies should
be carefully and critically examined to determine their efficacy and
social meaning, and most importantly, to determine “how they create
409. At the very least, municipalities should drastically circumscribe the current scope of
these home rule ordinances. The laws should include broad exceptions for victims of crime,
should only apply to people demonstrably under a tenant’s control, should require a conviction
or finding of fact that the prohibited activity actually occurred, should only apply to conduct
that presents a “substantial and direct threat to health and safety,” and should limit the
geographical scope to the leased premises. Most importantly, the fault level should be increased
from vicarious liability to something more akin to active participation. Letter from Sargent
Shriver National Center on Poverty Law to Belleville City Council on Crime Free Housing
Ordinance (Apr. 2, 2013) (http://www.povertylaw.org/advocacy/housing/pubs/letter-tobelleville).
410. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53–54 (1993).
411. Ayling & Grabosky, supra note 62, at 435.
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412

us as modern subjects.” Home rule ordinances appear to be
proliferating without due attention to their negative impact upon
families and social groups, and without adequate analysis of whether
they are actually effective in bringing about the goal of security they
seek to achieve.
Placing responsibility for the wrongful acts of children, family
members, and friends onto parents and heads of household constructs
the home as a site of deviance and control. The web of third-party
policing created by parental liability statutes, crime-free lease
addendums, and nuisance ordinances subjects the normally private
sphere of the family to intense internal surveillance and monitoring.
These ordinances appear to encourage a form of microgovernance
within the home that mimics or reproduces larger forms of law and
order, and punishes those who fail to replicate these systems within
their homes. The home or “the social space of the household becomes
413
fully implicated in systems of surveillance and social control.”
Social problems such as bullying, drug abuse, and criminality
need to be addressed, and creative and effective solutions need to be
explored. Security is also a laudable goal, particularly in
neighborhoods and buildings plagued by crime. However, as one
federal judge stated, “[t]he city cannot simply start throwing innocent
people out of private property to reduce crime in a troubled
414
neighborhood.” The high costs of third-party policing must be taken
into account when considering responses. Third-party policing may be
415
appropriate in other contexts, but it may be less appropriate when
aimed at intimate, familial, and close social relationships. The
dystopic effect of these types of third-party-policing ordinances is
hard to ignore:
[I]t is chillingly apparent that compliance . . . has a direct bearing
on . . . familial relations—that parents, children, and siblings are
compelled, at the very least, to “modify” how they interact and
associate with each other. Regulation and social control are deeply
insinuated in the most ordinary of microsocial relations—who visits
for dinner or overnight? What is his or her conduct on or off the
412. HARCOURT, supra note 378, at 242.
413. Mele, supra note 11, at 131–32.
414. Armendariz v. Penman, 31 F.3d 860, 872 (9th Cir. 1994) (Trott, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part), vacated in part on reh’g en banc, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996). Judge Robert
L. Trott was referring to a series of housing-code sweeps in San Bernardino, California, where
the city “faked a housing code emergency” and closed ninety-five buildings, evicting the tenants.
415. See supra text accompanying note 8.
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premises?—and the management of risks and their consequences
becomes the responsibility of mothers, fathers, and teenagers.
Likewise, otherwise innocuous visits from after-school friends,
caregivers, and babysitters are fraught with risk. Here we see social
regulation and control deeply insinuated in the most ordinary of
416
behaviors.

Indeed, if we think of home building as an “ideological
enterprise[],” then the questions of who can access and maintain
homes, and what rules may be state-enforced there, become even
417
more significant. Further, as the city emerges as a major source of
rules governing homes and intimate spaces, its role in using these
technologies of governance may become more pronounced, and may
therefore warrant greater attention than local-government law tends
to attract. In particular, the practical impact of these kinds of
ordinances, alongside their symbolic participation in problematic
histories of race, gender, and socioeconomic discrimination, raises
concern over the narratives of responsibility and the meaning of
“home” that they create, and the city’s role in their construction.

416. Mele, supra note 11, at 132–33.
417. Rana Jaleel, A Queer Home in the Midst of a Movement? Occupy Homes, Occupy
Homemaking, WHAT DEMOCRACY LOOKS LIKE, http://what-democracy-looks-like.com/aqueer-home-in-the-midst-of-a-movement-occupy-homes-occupy-homemaking (last visited Jan.
16, 2015).

